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            I ask’d thee, “Give me immortality.” 
 Then didst thou grant mine asking with a smile, 
 Like wealthy men who care not how they give. 
 But thy strong Hours indignant work’d their wills, 
 And beat me down and marr’d and wasted me, 
 And tho’ they could not end me, left me maim’d 
 To dwell in presence of immortal youth, 
 Immortal age beside immortal youth, 
 And all I was in ashes.1 
 
 Not one blossom of his loveliness would ever fade.  Not one  
   pulse of his life would ever weaken.  Like the gods of the  
   Greeks, he would be strong, and fleet, and joyous.  What did it  
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1 ALFRED LORD TENNYSON, Tithonus, in SELECTED POETRY OF TENNYSON 90, 90–91 (Douglas 
Bush ed., Modern Library 1951) (1860). 
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   matter what happened to the coloured image on the canvas?   
   He would be safe.  That was everything.2 
 
  Old age hath yet his honor and his toil. 
  Death closes all; but something ere the end, 
  Some work of noble note, may yet be done, 
  Not unbecoming men that strove with Gods.3 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Copyrights have the capacity to grow exceedingly old.  Indeed, 
they have no other choice.  Legislators in Europe and the United States, 
citing the imperatives of international harmonization and the needs of 
authors’ children and grandchildren,4 have seen fit to pass laws that 
endow all copyrights with a spectacular longevity.  Whereas a copyright 
under Great Britain’s Statute of Anne of 1710,5 or under the first 
national copyright act in the United States in 1790,6 endured for a term 
of fourteen years from the date of first publication with a possible 
 
2 OSCAR WILDE, The Picture of Dorian Gray, in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF OSCAR WILDE 11, 
88 (J.B. Foreman ed., HarperCollins Publishers 1989) (1891). 
3 TENNYSON, Ulysses, in SELECTED POETRY OF TENNYSON, supra note 1, at 89 (1842). 
4 See, for example, Senator Orrin Hatch’s defense of U.S. copyright term extensions.  Orrin G. 
Hatch, Toward a Principled Approach to Copyright Legislation at the Turn of the Millennium, 59 
U. PITT. L. REV. 719 (1998).  With respect to international harmonization, Hatch argued,  
[c]opyrighted works move across national borders faster and more easily than virtually 
any other economic commodity, and with the techniques now in common use this 
movement has in many cases become instantaneous and effortless.  The need to 
conform the duration of U.S. copyright to that prevalent throughout the rest of the 
world is increasingly pressing in order to provide certainty and simplicity in 
international business dealings.  
Id. at 729 (quoting S. REP. NO. 94-473, at 118 (1975).  As for the argument from grandchildren, 
Hatch contended,  
[i]n the United States, where works created before January 1, 1978 are still [as of 1998] 
afforded a 75-year fixed term of protection, the current term has proven increasingly 
inadequate to protect some works for even one generation of heirs as parents are living 
longer and having children later in life.   
Id. at 732.  In 1993, the Council of the European Communities issued a Directive requiring 
harmonization of copyright terms throughout the European Economic Community and 
enhancement of protection for the interests of authors and the first two generations of their 
descendants.  Council Directive 93/98/EEC, pmbl., 1993 O.J. (L 290) 9 (EC). 
5 Copyright Act, 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Eng.).  Under the Statute of Anne, “for new works the right 
was to run for 14 years, and the author was granted the privilege of renewal for 14 years more.”  
HERBERT A. HOWELL, THE COPYRIGHT LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF THE LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES GOVERNING REGISTRATION AND PROTECTION OF COPYRIGHT WORKS, INCLUDING 
PRINTS AND LABELS 2 (2d ed. 1948).  For an excellent discussion of the Statute of Anne, see 
MARK ROSE, AUTHORS AND OWNERS: THE INVENTION OF COPYRIGHT 42–48 (1993). 
6 Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124.   
The Act of 1790 assured protection to the author or his assigns of any “book, map or 
chart” for 14 years upon [completion of certain formalities involving recording the title 
with a court and publishing a copy of the record in a newspaper]. . . . The privilege of 
renewal of the copyright for 14 years more was granted to the author or his assigns on 
condition of again entering the title and publishing the record.   
HOWELL, supra note 5, at 4–5. 
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further term of fourteen years, today a copyright in the European Union7 
and the United States8 lasts from the moment the work is created until 
seventy years after its author’s death.  This means that if a writer 
completes her first novel at the age of thirty and lives to be eighty, that 
novel will automatically enjoy a total copyright term of 120 years, with 
no requirement that the author or her heirs renew or otherwise maintain 
the copyright along the way.  In the United States, corporate-owned 
works as well as older works published before 1978 enjoy a copyright 
term of 95 years from the year of first publication, again without any 
maintenance requirements.9 
The result of all this legislative largesse is compulsory old age for 
copyrights.  The rallying cry for the past several decades has been 
“More Rights for Copyright Owners!”  Now that we have entered the 
digital age, and every owner of a computer or a cell phone has the 
ability to reproduce and disseminate copies of works anywhere in the 
world at the press of a button, the call for expansive rights for copyright 
owners seems scarcely to require justification.10  That copyrighted 
works are an endangered species is now virtually unquestioned dogma; 
and lawmakers have responded with an unquestioning chivalry.11  Yet, 
despite all this hum and buzz of rights talk, no one has ever thought to 
ask an aging copyright if it wished to go on living.  (The distinction 
between a copyright and the work it protects will become clearer in a 
moment.  Although this Article explores the phenomenon of aging 
copyrights, its essential focus is the quality of life of the works 
protected by those copyrights.)  I suspect that if such a question could 
be put to many octogenarian and nonagenarian copyrights, they would 
answer, in the manner of the decrepit Sybil when she was teased by the 
children at Cumae: “I want to die.”12 
 
7 Council Directive 93/98/EEC, art. 1, 1993 O.J. (L 290) 9 (EC) (requiring member countries to 
implement by July 1, 1995, a term of protection equal to the life of the author plus seventy years). 
8 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2006). 
9 Id. §§ 302(c), 304.  The Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998 added twenty 
years to the copyright terms of both existing and future works.  Sonny Bono Copyright Term 
Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, § 102(d)(1)(B), 112 Stat. 2827, 2828 (codified at 17 U.S.C. 
§§ 302, 304 (2006)). 
10 “[T]he digital environment and the Internet have presented new challenges to existing 
copyright law.  The digital format allows perfect copies to be made virtually instantaneously.  The 
Internet allows copies to be widely distributed in a short period of time.”  Hatch, supra note 4, at 
726. 
11 Legislators’ fears have been especially keen in the context of online piracy: “Due to the ease 
with which digital works can be copied and distributed worldwide virtually instantaneously, 
copyright owners will hesitate to make their works readily available on the Internet without 
reasonable assurance that they will be protected against massive piracy.”  S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 
8 (1998). 
12 T.S. ELIOT, The Waste Land, in COLLECTED POEMS 1909–1962, at 51 (Harcourt Brace 
Jovanovich 1970) (1922).  The enfeebled Sybil at Cumae—a legendary prophetess granted long 
life but not youth to match—appears in the epigraph to Eliot’s poem.  The Sibyl’s words, which 
Eliot’s epigraph gives in Latin and Greek, are usually translated as “I want to die.”  E.g., 
RICHARD A. POSNER, AGING AND OLD AGE 101 (1995).  Posner’s economic analysis of aging is 
fascinating for the present context.  He briefly touches on the Cumaean Sibyl and Tennyson’s 
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If we really wanted to know the wishes of a copyright, we would 
have to consult the views of the public, for the purpose of copyrights 
lies in “the general benefits derived by the public from the labors of 
authors,” and copyright law “must ultimately serve the cause of 
promoting broad public availability of literature, music, and the other 
arts.”13  But the public is largely silent on this subject.  The 
consequences of copyright legislation impinge so lightly on each 
individual member of society that only a comparatively few motivated 
persons and organizations ever take the trouble to voice a dissenting 
view.  The fallout from extended copyrights settles upon each of us like 
a fine, invisible dust.  As with a penny sales tax, a copyright has no 
weight on the scale of our daily needs and wants.  It is society, not its 
individual members, that experiences the cumulative effects of long 
copyright terms, and “society” as such has neither voice nor vote.  
Political economists call this a problem of public choice.  In contrast to 
organized special interests that clamor for maximal proprietary rights, 
the typical citizen knows little about the role of copyrights in society 
and perceives no immediate, personal benefit or threat from any change 
that might be wrought in the laws of intellectual property.14 
As an exercise in awareness, it would be interesting to think of 
copyrights as living creatures inhabiting time, keenly conscious of the 
long life dictated for them by forces beyond their control.  By such a 
trick of personification, we might begin to understand the problem of 
aging copyrights, for copyrights indeed have an organic aspect that 
varies according to the length of protection they provide, the qualities of 
the works they protect, and the behavior of copyright owners.  Adding 
allegory to personification, I propose, in Parts I and II of this Article, to 
imagine copyrights under two figures drawn from myth and literature—
Tithonus and Dorian Gray—who exemplify the perils of attempting to 
defy the natural aging process.  In Part III, I discuss the copyrights in 
 
poems about Tithonus and Ulysses.  Id. at 100–01. 
13 Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975). 
14 James Boyle has described the public choice problem for users of intellectual property:  
It is a matter of rudimentary political science analysis or public choice theory to say 
that democracy fails when the gains of a particular action can be captured by a 
relatively small and well-identified group while the losses—even if larger in the 
aggregate—are low-level effects spread over a larger, more inchoate group. . . . The 
heirs and assigns of authors whose copyright has expired would obviously benefit if 
Congress were to put the fence back up around this portion of the intellectual 
commons.  There are obviously some costs—for example, to education and public 
debate—in not having multiple, competing low-cost editions of these works.  But these 
costs are individually small and are not imposed on a well-defined group of stake-
holders. 
James Boyle, A Politics of Intellectual Property: Environmentalism for the Net?, 47 DUKE L.J. 
87, 110–11 (1997).  In recent years, however, organizations such as the Creative Commons 
Corporation, the Electronic Frontier Foundation, and numerous amici curiae in high-profile court 
cases have sought to give voice to users of intellectual property.  For examples of such amici 
curiae, see infra notes 23 and 43. 
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the works of the famous Irish author James Joyce (1882–1941)—
including his novel Ulysses (1922)—which, along with the behavior of 
Joyce’s literary estate over the past three decades, offer a vivid 
illustration of the problem of prolonged copyrights in a changing 
culture.  I conclude the Article by offering another Ulysses—not 
Joyce’s novel, but Homer’s legendary Greek king and warrior as 
reimagined by the nineteenth-century English poet Alfred Tennyson—
as a normative model for a rational, compassionate copyright law that 
would accept the aging and death of exclusive rights as part of the cycle 
of creative life, and more wisely balance the interests of copyright 
owners and an expectant public. 
I. TITHONUS: IMMORTALITY WITHOUT YOUTH 
The myth of Tithonus presents the spectacle of immortality 
subjected to the ravages of time.  Eos, goddess of the dawn, carried off 
the mortal, Tithonus, and made him her lover.  She then asked Zeus to 
give Tithonus immortality, but neglected to ask that he be made ageless 
as well.  With the cruel obligingness reserved for hasty petitioners, the 
gods granted Eos the letter of her wish, but no more.  Tithonus remained 
with her in the realms of the east, but grew so old and feeble that, 
according to one version of the story, Eos had him shut up in a room 
behind heavy brazen doors, so that she would not have to hear his 
foolish chattering.15  Tennyson gives us a Tithonus in thoughtful, 
articulate despair over his predicament, longing to put off “cruel 
immortality” and to be restored to the condition of “happy men that 
have the power to die.”16  The poem is the immortal mortal’s frightened 
prayer for euthanasia to Eos, who, as Tithonus well knows, is helpless 
to alter what her own wish set in motion: “The Gods themselves cannot 
recall their gifts.”17 
Most modern copyrights face Tithonus’s predicament.  Few works 
ever have more than a brief shelf life; it is only the rare work, such as 
James Joyce’s Ulysses or A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man 
(1916), that achieves a lasting fame.  The vast majority of intellectual 
creations are destined for unremarkable and unmarketable obscurity,18 
remaining of interest, if at all, to a handful of scholars, antiquarians, or 
persons with special tastes.  Yet under our present laws, all such homely 
 
15 EDWARD TRIPP, THE MERIDIAN HANDBOOK OF CLASSICAL MYTHOLOGY 580 (1970). 
16 TENNYSON, supra note 1, at 90, 92. 
17 Id. at 91. 
18 See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, 70 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 471, 473–74 (2003) (“[O]nly a tiny fraction of the books ever published are still in print; for 
example, of 10,027 books published in the United States in 1930, only 174, or 1.7 percent, were 
still in print in 2001.  These data suggest that most copyrights depreciate rapidly . . . .”); Coree 
Thompson, Orphan Works, U.S. Copyright Law, and International Treaties: Reconciling 
Differences to Create a Brighter Future for Orphans Everywhere, 23 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 
787, 824 (2006) (“The commercial value of many works does not outlast the copyright term.”). 
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works are protected indiscriminately by extravagantly long copyrights 
from the moment of their creation, or, in the jargon of copyright 
lawyers, when they are “‘fixed’ in a tangible medium of expression.”19  
Forgotten by the public, of no economic value to publishers or even to 
their authors or their authors’ heirs, these aging works nevertheless 
remain tightly wrapped in the comparative immortality of copyright, 
“[a] white-hair’d shadow roaming like a dream / The ever-silent spaces 
of the East.”20 
It is no ordinary death for which an enfeebled copyright wishes.  
Rather, it longs for the afterlife of the public domain, where, in contrast 
to the limited goals and perspectives of its owner, numberless users are 
free to rejuvenate the formerly copyrighted work by ferreting out the 
work’s potential for new editions, adaptations, performances, and other 
transformative uses.  When a work enters the public domain, its status 
as private property vanishes, along with its aura of untouchability.21  It 
becomes available for unfettered exploitation by anyone who cares to 
take the trouble.  Until that time, however, even a copyrighted work that 
has been out of print for sixty years will seem off-limits to potential 
users.  And if an aspiring user does make an effort to seek permission 
for reprinting or adapting the old work, its copyright owner may be 
impossible to locate,22 or, if found, may prove difficult or 
uncomprehending.23  Publishers typically will not proceed with a project 
 
19 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (defining “fixed”). 
20 TENNYSON, supra note 1, at 90. 
21 For the sake of simplicity, I define “public domain” here as the common pool of works that 
lack copyright protection, either because they preceded the recognition of common-law or 
statutory rights in such works or because their copyrights have expired.  See Miriam Bitton, 
Modernizing Copyright Law, 20 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 65, 69 (2011) (“[T]he public domain is 
composed of content that is completely free from intellectual property rights, such as works 
whose intellectual property rights have expired, and works that did not or do not qualify for 
intellectual property rights.”).  I recognize that this is only one definition of the public domain.  A 
growing body of scholarship has discovered the multiple meanings and assumptions that underlie 
uses of the term.  See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Enriching Discourse on Public Domains, 55 
DUKE L.J. 783, 788–812 (2006) (discussing thirteen different conceptions of the public domain); 
James Boyle, Foreword: The Opposite of Property?, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 28–32 
(2003) (summarizing various scholars’ definitions of the terms “public domain” and “commons”). 
22 Marybeth Peters, the former U.S. Register of Copyrights, has described what is often called the 
“orphan works” problem: 
[I]t is exceedingly difficult to determine the copyright status of certain types of works, 
e.g., photographs, prints and labels.  Moreover, finding the current owner can be 
almost impossible.  Where the copyright registration records show that the author is the 
owner finding a current address or the appropriate heir is extremely difficult.  Where 
the original owner was a corporation, the task is somewhat easier but here too there are 
many assignments and occasionally bankruptcies with no clear title to works. 
Copyright Term Extension Act of 1995: Hearing on S. 483 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
104th Cong. 18–19 (1995) (statement of Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights, U.S. Copyright 
Office). 
23 For example, the authors of “Who Built America?” (an award-winning CD-ROM produced by 
the American Social History Project in collaboration with the Center for History and New 
Media), which contains many primary sources from the Depression Era and is intended for high 
school and college students and teachers, “had immense difficulties tracking down copyright 
owners, who, when found, sometimes wanted large payments for older works whose only present 
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until all rights are cleared and all rights-holders pacified.24  The result is 
copyright gridlock, a paralysis of creative energies.  Aging copyrights 
serve little purpose other than to endow many ordinary creations, like 
Tithonus, with a cruel immortality that benefits neither copyright 
owners nor the public. 
There was a time when copyright law, in the United States at least, 
had a wiser policy for caring for its elderly.  Prior to 1978, publication 
was the significant event in a copyright’s life.  When a work was 
published in the United States with a proper copyright notice, federal 
protection began and continued for a modest term of twenty-eight 
years.25  In the last year of that term, the author or copyright proprietor, 
if he or she desired a further twenty-eight years of protection, was 
required to renew the copyright by completing an application and filing 
it with the U.S. Copyright Office in Washington, D.C.26  If these 
formalities were not observed, the copyright would automatically 
terminate at the end of its first term, and the work would pass into the 
public domain at the youthful age of twenty-eight.  This system had its 
flaws, of course.  Sometimes, a copyright owner would bungle the 
paperwork or miss a deadline and be forced to pay the penalty of 
relinquishing the work to the public.27  When the United States joined 
the international Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and 
Artistic Works in 1989, a condition of its membership was that it do 
away with or modify many U.S. copyright formalities.28  As a result, 
 
value was historical.”  The authors were forced to omit many works entirely because “copyright 
owners insisted upon thousands of dollars for minor uses.”  Brief of College Art Ass’n et al. as 
Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at *7, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01–
618). 
24 Richard J. Cox, a scholar of book preservation and other matters affecting libraries, has 
described the labyrinthine difficulties he encountered when his academic publisher effectively 
waived his privilege of fair use and required him to seek permission for all the quotations from a 
book by Nicholson Baker that Cox had included in his scholarly monograph replying to Baker.  
Richard J. Cox, Unfair Use: Advice to Unwitting Authors, 34 J. SCHOLARLY PUB. 31 (2002); see 
also Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech and How 
Copying Serves It, 114 YALE L.J. 535, 583–85 (2004) (“It should be no surprise that publishers 
. . . require permission for even brief quotations, resolving the legal uncertainty with a bright-line 
rule that affords security by rigidly controlling speech. . . . [P]ublishers generally now require 
permission for almost any copying, even in academic contexts, especially when images are 
involved.”). 
25  Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, §§ 9, 23, 35 Stat. 1075 (repealed 1978). 
26 Id. §§ 23–24. 
27 See MARSHALL A. LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW 230–31 (3d ed. 1999) 
(noting that, formerly, copyright renewal terms were lost through authors’ ignorance of the 
renewal requirements); HOWELL, supra note 5, at 102–03 (explaining that authors sometimes 
risked losing the renewal term through late submission of applications). 
28 While the Berne Convention originally made authors’ rights subject to any formalities 
prescribed by the country of origin of a work, see Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary 
and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, art. 2(2), reprinted in LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, 
INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT UNION: BERNE CONVENTION, 1886; PARIS CONVENTION, 1896; 
BERLIN CONVENTION, 1908, at 33 (Copyright Off., Bull. No. 13, 1908), the 1908 Berlin 
amendments provided that “[t]he enjoyment and the exercise of such rights are not subject to any 
formality . . . .”  Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Berlin Act, 
Nov. 13, 1908, art. 4(2), reprinted in id. at 19.  On March 1, 1989, Congress passed the Berne 
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American copyright law, with a few exceptions, abolished the renewal 
requirement.29  Henceforth, with respect to every kind of work, 
copyright protection would arise not upon publication, but at the 
moment of creation, and would last for a lengthy, unbroken term 
running from the death of the author into the far reaches of the future.30 
Abandoning the old bisected copyright term and the law’s renewal 
requirement was a bad idea, no matter how much it may have helped the 
United States become a more acceptable partner in international 
copyright relations.  The act of renewing a copyright meant that its 
owner cared enough about the property right to comply with the modest 
formalities required by the Copyright Act.  It is surprising how few 
copyright owners ever took the trouble.  Several decades ago, the U.S. 
Copyright Office conducted a study of original registrations of 
copyrights made during the fiscal year 1927, matching those 
registrations with their corresponding renewals filed twenty-seven years 
later, during the fiscal year 1954.31  Original registrations for all classes 
of works totaled 180,864; renewals totaled 17,304.32  This means that 
owners of statutory copyrights acquired in the year that Charles 
Lindbergh flew the Atlantic in a one-motor airplane renewed a startling 
9.5%33 of those copyrights in the year that U.S. Air Force B-47 
Stratojets crossed the Pacific Ocean in under fifteen hours.34 
While some of those non-renewals no doubt resulted from 
inadvertent lapses, it is likely that a large number of copyright owners 
simply did not find it worth their while to renew copyright claims for 
works that held no economic or other significance for them.35  When it 
is added that the highest percentage of renewals in 1954 were in the 
categories of published music (45%) and motion picture photoplays 
(43.7%),36 it becomes clear that the vast majority of traditional literary 
 
Convention Implementation Act of 1988.  Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 (1988).  
29 Copyright Renewal Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-307, 106 Stat. 264 (1992) (codified at 17 
U.S.C. § 304(a)(3)(B) (2006)) (abolishing renewal as a condition of extended copyright for works 
published and copyrighted between 1964 and 1977). 
30 The 1976 Copyright Act effectively abolished the renewal requirement for all works created 
after 1977 by establishing a continuous copyright term consisting of the author’s life plus seventy 
years.  17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2006). 
31 JAMES J. GUINAN, JR., DURATION OF COPYRIGHT, STUDY NO. 30, COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION, 
PREPARED FOR THE SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS OF THE S. COMM. 
ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG. 82 (Comm. Print, 2d Sess. 1957). 
32 Id. 
33 Id. 
34 JAN TEGLER, B-47 STRATOJET: BOEING’S BRILLIANT BOMBER 112 (2000).  It was estimated 
that in 1959 approximately fifteen percent of then-existing copyrights were being renewed.  
BARBARA RINGER, RENEWAL OF COPYRIGHT, STUDY NO. 31, COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION, 
PREPARED FOR THE SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS OF THE S. COMM. 
ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG. 187, 221–22 (Comm. Print, 2d Sess. 1961). 
35 Christopher Sprigman, Reform(aliz)ing Copyright, 57 STAN. L. REV. 485, 519 (2004) 
(“Authors would not bother . . . to renew works that ceased to profit them at the end of the initial 
term and for which they held no realistic expectation of future profit.”). 
36 GUINAN, supra note 31, at 82. 
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and dramatic works—books, stories, plays, and the like—were allowed 
to enter the public domain at the end of twenty-eight years, the same 
total term of protection that the earliest legislation in Britain and the 
United States had conferred upon creations of the intellect.  The renewal 
requirement thus served as a valuable clearinghouse for unwanted 
copyrights, sweeping into the cultural commons vast quantities of works 
that no longer needed the protections of a legal monopoly.  Essentially a 
mechanism for allocating resources to their highest and best use, the 
renewal formality permitted the diverse, undisciplined creativity of the 
public to go to work on previously neglected works whose 
transformative potential their owners had failed to recognize or exploit.  
And it allowed the public to do this decades in advance of what 
otherwise would have been the expiration of copyright protection. 
Although the present scope of copyright law covers a much 
broader array of works than in the past, and digital technologies may 
have increased the shelf life of some works,37 there is no reason to 
believe that today’s copyright owners would be much more diligent in 
renewing copyrights in unprofitable works than copyright owners were 
in 1954.  What has changed since 1954 is that all these works that were 
formerly allowed to go betimes into the good night of the public domain 
are now condemned to a lengthy term of mandatory protection from 
which there is no reprieve.  Just as the immortal Tithonus, growing 
weaker and more useless with each dawn, longed to be restored to “the 
ground,” to the “grassy barrows of the happier dead,”38 so these aging 
copyrights yearn for union with the good earth of the public domain, 
where at worst they will sink into a dignified obscurity and at best may 
attract the energies of individuals who perceive a potential for new, vital 
uses—uses that may in turn generate new, vital copyrights.  What the 
Copyright Clause of the U.S. Constitution refers to as “the progress of 
Science”39 (or the creation and spread of knowledge and learning)40 
depends crucially on the smooth functioning of this cultural ecosystem.  
While it lasted, the renewal system played an important role in 
administering a kind of public-spirited hemlock to Tithonus-like 
copyrights. 
There have been various proposals for reviving copyright renewal 
requirements in the United States.  Several years ago, law professor and 
legal activist Lawrence Lessig urged a modified version of renewal that 
 
37 See Hatch, supra note 4, at 734 (“Since 1976, the likelihood that a work will remain highly 
profitable beyond the current term of copyright protection has increased significantly as the rate 
of technological advancement in communications and electronic media has continued to 
accelerate, particularly with the advent of digital media and the explosive growth of the 
Internet.”). 
38 TENNYSON, supra note 1, at 92. 
39 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
40 Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 888 (2012). 
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was introduced in Congress as a bill entitled the “Public Domain 
Enhancement Act.”  The bill, had it been enacted, would have required 
every copyright holder to pay a one-dollar “maintenance fee” fifty years 
after the first publication of a work and every ten years thereafter until 
the end of the work’s copyright term.  As the draft bill explained, 
the existing copyright system functions contrary to the intent of the 
Framers of the Constitution in adopting the copyright clause and the 
intent of Congress in enacting the Copyright Act.  Neither is 
intended to deprive the public of works when there is no commercial 
or copyright purpose behind their continued protection.  It is, 
therefore, necessary to establish a mechanism by which abandoned 
American copyrights can enter the public domain.41 
In effect, the Public Domain Enhancement Act proposed to solve 
the problem of Tithonus by restoring a user-friendly version of the 
renewal system, thus giving legislators what the gods themselves 
lacked: the power to recall their improvident gift of immortality. 
There is something melancholy about this vast uncultivated field 
of abandoned copyrights, each one forgotten or neglected by the 
necessarily limited vision of its single owner when it might be turned 
over to the many-eyed resourcefulness of the public domain.  We have 
only to think of the millions of feet of copyrighted celluloid that lie 
crumbling in public archives or private collections.  According to some 
estimates, as much as fifty percent of the film titles produced before 
1950 have been lost.42  The owners of many of the films that do survive 
have the expertise, interest, and funding to restore them, but, because 
copyrights in the films are held by others, the owners lack an economic 
incentive to restore what they know they would be prevented by law 
from exhibiting or selling to the public.  Conversely, “[e]ven if the 
copyright holder both knows and cares about the film, it cannot 
undertake restoration because it possesses no physical copy.”43  This is a 
catch-22 of copyright law: a film owner without a copyright; a 
copyright holder without a film.  As the Librarian of Congress put it, the 
consequence of all these multiple property interests and legal 
restrictions is that “[f]or many of those seeking copies of films, 
 
41 Public Domain Enhancement Act, H.R. 2408, 109th Cong. § 306 (2005); H.R. 2601, 108th 
Cong. § 306(a) (2003).  The bill was referred to the House Judiciary Committee and has not been 
passed.  See also LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS 251–52 (2001) (proposing a five-
year copyright term, renewable fifteen times); Landes & Posner, supra note 18, at 473, 477 
(proposing a system of indefinitely renewable copyright whereby owners, in order to maintain 
their property rights, would be required to renew copyright registrations every ten years or so by 
filing some paperwork and paying a fee). 
42 1 REPORT OF THE LIBRARIAN OF CONGRESS, FILM PRESERVATION 1993: A STUDY OF THE 
CURRENT STATE OF AMERICAN FILM PRESERVATION (1993), available at http:// 
www.loc.gov/film/study.html#six. 
43 Brief of Hal Roach Studios & Michael Agee as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at *13, 
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01–618). 
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archivists can look as if they are perversely saving films for a posterity 
that never quite arrives.”44 
It has been argued that longer copyrights are needed to provide 
movie studios with incentives to restore the films they hold,45 but the 
works in the most urgent need of restoration are “orphan films.”  
Numerically the majority of movies remaining in our film legacy, these 
neglected works include documentaries, newsreels, independent 
productions, sound films made by now-defunct studios, and rare historic 
footage documenting daily life for ethnic minorities.46  A compelling 
argument can be made for allowing these treasures to pass quickly into 
the cultural commons, where numberless potential researchers and 
investors may search out the value—economic, historical, sentimental, 
hobbyist—of these deteriorating images of the early twentieth century.  
Who is to say that the public domain, with its great, heterogeneous 
complex of ideas and purposes, would not prove the better custodian of 
our cinematic legacy?  If Tithonus has a direct counterpart in the world 
of intellectual property, it must be in the copyrighted silver-nitrate dust 
of these vanishing witnesses to a vanished culture. 
II. DORIAN GRAY: ETERNAL YOUTH WITHOUT MORALITY 
Tithonus is one figure for conceptualizing the waste of overlong 
copyright protection.  But not all copyrighted works are forgotten a few 
years after their birth.  A few lucky works—a tiny fraction in 
comparison with the totality of cultural products—remain in print or 
available in some other medium for a few decades or more.47  In turn, a 
small subset of those works are the truly charmed creations—James 
Joyce’s writings, for example—which enjoy a celebrity commensurate 
with their copyright terms, or longer.  For those happy few copyrights, a 
different allegory is needed; and it can be found in Oscar Wilde’s 
strange tale of youth miraculously preserved into middle age.  The 
Picture of Dorian Gray inverts the fate of Tithonus.  Where the 
handsome young man of the myth of the dawn received everlasting life 
without eternal youth, the naïve hero of Wilde’s story prays for 
immortal youth but, under the influence of his decadent aristocratic 
friend Lord Henry, never thinks to ask for moral integrity to match.48 
Dorian Gray is the embodiment of fin-de-siècle art for art’s sake: a 
 
44 FILM PRESERVATION 1993, supra note 42. 
45 See, e.g., Hatch, supra note 4, at 736–37. 
46 FILM PRESERVATION 1993, supra note 42. 
47 See Landes & Posner, supra note 18, at 473–74 (“[O]nly a tiny fraction of the books ever 
published are still in print . . . .”). 
48 Dorian strikes his Faustian bargain at the moment when, gazing enviously at his portrait, he 
murmurs, “‘If it were I who was to be always young, and the picture that was to grow old!  For 
that—for that—I would give everything!  Yes, there is nothing in the whole world I would not 
give!  I would give my soul for that!’”  WILDE, supra note 2, at 34. 
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beautiful design without ethical content.  “They are the elect,” wrote 
Wilde, “to whom beautiful things mean only Beauty.  There is no such 
thing as a moral or an immoral book.  Books are well written, or badly 
written.  That is all.”49  That it is a painted image of Dorian, instead of 
its flesh-and-blood subject, that undergoes the effects of aging and 
moral abandonment is a further Wildean twist on the notion of a 
perfectly amoral art.  The portrait of the young Adonis, hidden away in 
an attic schoolroom, takes on all the outward and visible signs of 
Dorian’s secret crimes and debaucheries.  Yet all the while, London 
society sees only the perpetually youthful dandy with exquisite 
manners. 
Although it is clear that copyright law confers on lesser, Tithonus-
like works a wholly unnecessary and debilitating immortality, it might 
be thought that, conversely, the law is fully justified in bestowing such 
lavish protection on the comparatively few works that have proved their 
capacity for sustained popularity.  It has been argued that prolonging the 
copyright monopoly for works such as these is a good thing: the owner 
of a successful resource has incentives to maintain and cultivate that 
resource if there is an enforceable property right to justify investment.50  
But the success of an aging copyright, like Dorian Gray’s uncanny 
youth, is purchased at a dear price: a famous eighty-year-old work 
might appear to have benefited from the youth-preserving effects of its 
copyright—one thinks, inevitably, of the ubiquitous merry demeanor of 
Mickey Mouse—but there are corruptions and deformations, carefully 
hidden away in the attic of our culture, that mar this perfect picture.  
The tale of Dorian Gray and his painted image captures this paradox of 
cultural monopoly perfectly.  Like the handsome face of Dorian, the 
preservative qualities of long copyrights tell only half the story.  What is 
shielded from the public’s gaze, because withheld from the public 
domain, is the other side of copyright.  “Beneath its purple pall, the face 
painted on the canvas could grow bestial, sodden, and unclean.  What 
did it matter?  No one could see it.”51 
The hidden corruption of a long-celebrated copyright manifests 
itself as an absence, a vacancy, an empty parenthesis of all the things 
that might have been, had that copyright not held them back from 
culture by permitting a sole monopolist to police for many decades the 
uses to which the work might be put.  Stephen Dedalus, one of the chief 
characters in Ulysses, imagines the particular events of history as 
 
49 Id. at 17. 
50 The notion that granting and enforcing property interests will increase the care and efficiency 
with which resources are managed is a time-honored concept.  “The economic utility theory 
justifies the protection of property interests as a means of creating incentives for the efficient use 
of resources.”  Catherine M. Valerio Barrad, Genetic Information and Property Theory, 87 NW. 
U. L. REV. 1037, 1079 (1993). 
51 WILDE, supra note 2, at 99. 
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displacing myriad other potentials: “Time has branded them and fettered 
they are lodged in the room of the infinite possibilities they have 
ousted.”52  A century-long copyright is an ouster of historical 
possibilities; it mounts vigilant guard over a work and watches with 
satisfaction as hosts of phantom projects file by in sullen 
disappointment, “white forms and fragments streaming by mutely, 
sustaining vain gestures on the air.”53  Or, as Dorian Gray wonders of 
the slowly decaying painted image of himself: “Was it to become a 
monstrous and loathsome thing, to be hidden away in a locked room, to 
be shut out from the sunlight that had so often touched to brighter gold 
the waving wonder of its hair?  The pity of it!  The pity of it!”54  
Overlong copyrights inflict invisible losses; they put us mournfully in 
mind of the hidden might-have-beens of culture, the untested 
contenders, the possibilities surrendered by law so that an elderly 
copyright might retain superficial youth and beauty for a few more 
decades. 
III. A PORTRAIT OF THE ARTIST AS AN ETERNALLY YOUNG MAN:          
THE ESTATE OF JAMES JOYCE 
Few holders of aging copyrights have been more publicly 
aggressive about guarding their property than the estate of James Joyce.  
During the past three decades, copyright in the estate’s hands has 
become more a sword than a shield, and the estate has seemed to deny 
permissions almost on principle and often on the ground of personal 
taste.55  In 2000, for example, the Irish Times reported that the estate 
had denied the request of a twenty-three-year-old Irish composer, David 
Fennessy, to use eighteen words from Joyce’s Finnegans Wake 
(1939)—a prose work of 628 pages56—in a short choral piece 
 
52 JAMES JOYCE, ULYSSES 21 (Hans Walter Gabler et al. eds., Random House 1986) (1922). 
53 Id. at 83 (describing the appearance of tombs and mortuary sculpture as a carriage enters a 
graveyard). 
54 WILDE, supra note 2, at 88. 
55 For the first several decades after Joyce’s death in 1941, the representatives of his literary 
estate generally encouraged and facilitated scholarship.  For a history of the Joyce estate, see IAN 
HAMILTON, KEEPERS OF THE FLAME: LITERARY ESTATES AND THE RISE OF BIOGRAPHY 288–90 
(1992); BRUCE ARNOLD, THE SCANDAL OF ULYSSES: THE LIFE AND AFTERLIFE OF A 
TWENTIETH CENTURY MASTERPIECE 96–102 (rev. ed. 2004).  In the mid-1980s, Joyce’s 
grandson, Stephen James Joyce, declared his intention to assert himself forcefully in estate 
matters, and from that time forward he has used the estate’s copyright power to control uses of 
Joyce’s writings and to protect family privacy.  Id. at 102, 109–10, 245–46.  Scholars have 
documented and analyzed the Joyce estate’s aggressively restrictive policies.  See generally 
David S. Olson, First Amendment Based Copyright Misuse, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 537, 547–
55 (2010); Matthew Rimmer, Bloomsday: Copyright Estates and Cultural Festivals, 2 SCRIPTED 
345 (2005), http://www.law.ed.ac.uk/ahrc/script-ed/vol2-3/bloomsday.asp; Robert Spoo, 
Copyrights and “Design-Around” Scholarship, 44 JAMES JOYCE Q. 563 (2007); Robert Spoo, 
Note, Copyright Protectionism and its Discontents: The Case of James Joyce’s Ulysses in 
America, 108 YALE L.J. 633, 660–63 & n.150 (1998). 
56 JAMES JOYCE, FINNEGANS WAKE (Viking 1974) (1939). 
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commissioned by Lyric FM for a Europe-wide broadcast.57  The Times 
noted that Stephen James Joyce, the author’s grandson and sole direct 
descendant, had written Fennessy that he and his wife simply did not 
like the composer’s music.  Fennessy was crushed and baffled: 
I don’t mind if they hate my music, but how can the personal taste of 
Stephen Joyce and his wife be the right criteria to use? . . . Now the 
whole thing is gone: it’s not so much losing the commission fee, 
which I sorely needed, or the European broadcast.  My piece can’t 
ever exist because it can’t be performed.58 
Around the same time, the news media reported that the Joyce 
estate had demanded that the Edinburgh Festival’s Fringe organizers 
cancel a cabaret show, Molly Bloom: A Musical Dream, in which a 
Molly figure, played by the actress Anna Zapparoli, lay atop a grand 
piano, serving as her bed, and related her scandalous adventures.  
Zapparoli’s adults-only reminiscences included “Rap of Spunk” and 
“Song of Sucking.”59  The estate was quoted as objecting in particular to 
the treatment of Molly’s soliloquy as if it were a circus act or a jazz 
improvisation.60  The Fringe producers defended their right to use 
Joyce’s text by invoking a U.K. copyright provision that grants a 
“license as of right” (or what is often called a compulsory license) to 
anyone wishing to make use of a work whose copyright was revived in 
1996 (as the Joyce copyrights were) by British legislation implementing 
the European Council’s copyright-term harmonization Directive.61  A 
spokesman stated that the Fringe “‘is one of the biggest platforms for 
free speech and it would be going against the spirit of it if we cancelled.  
We understand that the production is perfectly legal and the permission 
of the Joyce estate is not needed so there is nothing we can, or would, 
do.’”62 
 
57 See Medb Ruane, The War of Words over Joyce’s Literary Legacy, IRISH TIMES, June 10, 
2000. 
58 Id. at 9. 
59 Iain S. Bruce, Joyce Grandson Fury over Fringe Musical Filth, SUNDAY HERALD (Scot.), July 
30, 2000, http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P2-19056477.html. 
60 Vanessa Thorpe, A Joyce Bans Molly’s Musical Climax, OBSERVER, July 30, 2000, http:// 
www.themodernword.com/joyce/article_molly_observer.html (attributing these remarks to 
Stephen James Joyce). 
61 The U.K. compulsory-license provision permits any use of a work that has been restored from 
the public domain pursuant to Council Directive 93/98/EEC, 1993 O.J. (L 290) 9 (EC), and 
requires only that the user give reasonable notice of the intended use and offer a reasonable 
royalty or remuneration to the copyright owner.  If a reasonable sum cannot be agreed upon, a 
Copyright Tribunal will determine the license terms.  Once the user has given reasonable notice, 
he or she is licensed, and the remuneration may be determined later.  Duration of Copyright and 
Rights in Performances Regulations, 1995, S.I. 1995/3297, arts. 24–25 (U.K.).  Thus, the license 
is compulsory, or “as of right.”  The copyright owner can haggle over royalties, but he or she 
cannot withhold the license. 
62 Kate Watson-Smyth, Joyce’s Grandson Tries to Keep Explicit Molly Bloom off the Stage, 
INDEP. (July 31, 2000), http://www.independent.co.uk/arts-entertainment/theatre-dance/features/
joyces-grandson-tries-to-keep-explicit-molly-bloom-off-the-stage-715671.html. 
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The estate evidently had no quarrel with the sexually explicit 
language that Joyce incorporated into “Penelope,” the famous final 
episode of Ulysses; rather, it objected to various adaptations of the 
episode.  According to the Observer, Stephen James Joyce contended 
that “Penelope” had not been written for the stage or for performance, 
but rather was the final section of a “novel.”63  His remark suggests that 
the estate’s goal has been to shield Joyce’s works from being modified 
by the kinds of transformative insights that derivative works—as 
copyright law calls them64—can bring to even the greatest, most 
comprehensive masterpieces.  The attempt by a copyright owner to use 
his exclusive derivative-work right (that is, the right to prepare 
adaptations of the copyrighted work) to enforce a kind of moral right is 
nothing new.65  But the idea that Ulysses the “novel” (as Mr. Joyce 
called it) should remain faithfully confined to its own genre ignores the 
fact that Ulysses inhabits no such stable category in the first place, but 
instead owes much of its power as an avant-garde work to its refusal to 
become the product of anything except its own textual volatility.  
Tipsily based on Homer’s epic and Shakespeare’s tragedy, and 
incorporating catechisms, newspaper headlines, expressionist drama, 
literature anthologies, and a fuga per canonem, Ulysses is itself a 
derivative work par excellence, a full, unabashed confession that 
cultural borrowings make up the fabric of art and life.66 
 
63 Thorpe, supra note 60. 
64 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2006). 
65 See, e.g., Gilliam v. Am. Broad. Cos., 538 F.2d 14, 20–21, 25 (2d Cir. 1976) (holding that a 
broadcaster’s truncation of Monty Python skits likely infringed the comedy group’s adaptation 
right).  In the litigation over Alice Randall’s revisionary novel The Wind Done Gone, the 
Margaret Mitchell Trust sued to prevent publication of what it argued was, among other things, a 
derivative work based without authorization on Mitchell’s novel Gone With the Wind (1936).  
Over the years, the Mitchell Trust has been extremely selective in permitting sequels to GWTW 
and has demanded that any derivative work it does authorize avoid such subjects as 
homosexuality and miscegenation.  TWDG confronted both.  Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin 
Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1282 & n.6 (11th Cir. 2001) (Marcus, J., concurring).  The Eleventh Circuit 
reversed the trial court’s grant of a preliminary injunction to the plaintiff Trust, holding that, as a 
“highly transformative” parody, Randall’s novel constituted a fair use of otherwise protected 
elements of GWTW.  Id. at 1269.  The court’s strongly-worded opinion, which was unusual for 
the emphasis it placed on First Amendment values in the copyright context, concluded that, in 
light of TWDG’s transformative purpose and the unlikelihood that so subversive a work would 
usurp the market for the sanitized sequels that the Trust typically permits, the district court had 
erred in issuing a preliminary injunction.  Id. at 1276-77; see also Neil Weinstock Netanel, 
Locating Copyright Within the First Amendment Skein, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1, 2-3, 82-83 (2001) 
(discussing the copyright and First Amendment implications of the lawsuit over Randall’s novel).  
Of course, GWTW is another work that has benefited from the Sonny Bono Copyright Term 
Extension Act, see supra note 9, and, like Ulysses, GWTW has contributed a potent historical 
myth to a culture that has arguably outgrown the copyright that permits its legal owners to police 
the adaptations that the myth inspires or provokes.  With its extended copyright term, GWTW will 
remain protected until 2031, 95 years after its first publication and 168 years after the 
Emancipation Proclamation.  17 U.S.C. § 304(b) (2006). 
66 Many scholars have examined the multiple literary genres and stylistic experiments that Joyce 
incorporated in Ulysses.  See, e.g., RICHARD ELLMANN, JAMES JOYCE 459-60, 475-76 (rev. ed. 
1983) (discussing Joyce’s stylistic experiments in Ulysses); see also generally, STUART GILBERT, 
JAMES JOYCE’S ULYSSES: A STUDY (Vintage Books 1955) (1930) (conducting an exhaustive 
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As the boundary between scholarly and popular uses of Joyce’s 
works has become harder to locate, the desire to celebrate Ulysses as 
part of shared, communal events has increased.  Each year, the sixteenth 
of June, or “Bloomsday”—the day on which the fictional events of 
Ulysses take place—inspires exuberant acts of homage, imitation, and 
declamation.  Friends gather in pubs to sing “Love’s Old Sweet Song,” 
“The Croppy Boy,” and other songs that Joyce wove into the larger 
symphony of Ulysses.67  Far and wide, people come together to read 
Ulysses or to hear it read, privately or in public; sometimes these 
readings are even broadcast over the radio or streamed over the 
Internet.68  It is hard to imagine anyone wanting to discourage such 
popular outpourings of love for a great book, but some years ago the 
Joyce estate sued over a Bloomsday audio-webcast of an international 
reading of Ulysses.  Encouraged by Irish government officials and 
sponsored by prominent Irish businesses, this nonprofit global Internet 
reading was planned as a vehicle for uniting Joyce enthusiasts 
throughout the world.69  By means of threats and litigation, the Joyce 
estate aggressively sought, and in part accomplished, an embargo of 
such Internet-based events for several years, until recently when Ulysses 
and other works by Joyce entered the public domain throughout the 
European Economic Area.70 
 
survey of Homeric parallels and other literary devices that Joyce included in his novel); WILLIAM 
M. SCHUTTE, JOYCE AND SHAKESPEARE: A STUDY IN THE MEANING OF ULYSSES (1957) 
(cataloguing quotations from and allusions to Shakespeare and his works in Ulysses).  For Joyce’s 
deployment of specific stylistic devices, see JOYCE, supra note 52, at 96–123 (newspaper 
headlines), 210–39 (fuga per canonem), 314–49 (literature anthologies), 350–497 (expressionist 
drama), 544–606 (catechism). 
67 See, e.g., JOYCE, supra note 52, at 52, 61, 232–35, 580 (quoting or alluding to “Love’s Old 
Sweet Song” and “The Croppy Boy”).  Advertisements for Bloomsday in various parts of the 
world regularly promise the performance of songs mentioned in Joyce’s text.  See, e.g., First 
Bloomsday Event Announced—Songs of Joyce, JAMES JOYCE CENTRE, http://www.jamesjoyce.ie/
detail.asp?ID=201 (last visited Sept. 14, 2012) (at Bewley’s Café Theatre in Dublin, Ireland); 
31st Annual Bloomsday on Broadway, SYMPHONY SPACE, http://www.symphonyspace.org/event/
7093-31st-annual-bloomsday-on-broadway (last visited Sept. 14, 2012) (at Symphony Space in 
New York City); Bloomsday 2011 Readers List, ROSENBACH MUSEUM & LIBRARY, 
http://www.rosenbach.org/bloomsday-2011-readers-list (last visited Sept. 14, 2012) (providing a 
Bloomsday reading list); Bloomsday in Glasgow, UNIVERSITY OF GLASGOW, http://
www.gla.ac.uk/events/music/?action=details&id=5428 (last visited Sept. 14, 2012) (at the U. 
Glasgow); Bloomsday 2010—Curitiba, VERDES TRIGOS, http:// 
www.verdestrigos.org/wordpress/?p=2139 (last visited Sept. 14, 2012) (in Curitiba, Brazil).  As a 
Joyce scholar and former editor of the James Joyce Quarterly, I have attended many song-filled 
Bloomsday events. 
68 On June 16, 2011, readings from Ulysses by well-known actors and other personalities were 
broadcast over WBAI 99.5 FM in New York City and KPFK 90.7FM in Los Angeles and 
streamed internationally on wbai.org, as part of an event called Radio Bloomsday. See Radio 
Bloomsday June 16, 2011, RADIO BLOOMSDAY, http://radiobloomsday.blogspot.com (last visited 
Sept. 14, 2012). 
69 See Rimmer, supra note 55 (describing the Joyce estate’s litigation over a 1998 Internet-based 
Bloomsday reading of Ulysses).  
70 Throughout much of Europe, editions of Joyce’s works that were published during his lifetime, 
as well as his unpublished works, passed out of copyright at the end of 2011, seventy years after 
his death.  Council Directive 93/98/EEC, art. 1, 1993 O.J. (L 290) 9 (EC) (requiring member 
countries to implement a copyright term of the author’s life plus seventy years).  The Irish law, 
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The threat of copyright litigation can be formidable, and it has 
intimidated even a few non-Joyce scholars.  In 2011, the biologist J. 
Craig Venter and his U.S.-based team announced that they had created 
the first synthetic life form by replacing DNA from bacteria with 
computer-generated genetic code as a means of distinguishing the 
team’s manufactured DNA from the kind occurring naturally.  One of 
the synthetic texts that the team chose to splice into nature was a line 
from Joyce’s A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man: “To live, to err, to 
fall, to triumph, to recreate life out of life!”71  Venter soon received a 
demand letter from the Joyce estate threatening litigation.72  He 
explained that he had assumed that his use of fourteen words from 
Joyce’s 253-page novel was a “fair use.”73  Venter’s use was more than 
just fair.  Early editions of the novel, all of which contain the identical 
phrase,74 have been in the U.S. public domain since the end of 1991,75 
but the legally unprotected status of these texts did not stop the estate 
from bullying the scientist.  The estate’s act of overreaching continued a 
pattern of copyright misuse that has been evident for years, as I discuss 
below. 
The Joyce estate has not confined itself to mere threats of 
litigation.  In October 2000, the Irish High Court granted the estate an 
interlocutory (preliminary) injunction preventing Cork University Press 
from publishing extracts of Danis Rose’s Reader’s Edition of Ulysses76 
in an anthology entitled Irish Writing in the Twentieth Century: A 
Reader.77  The publisher of the anthology had originally sought the 
estate’s permission to publish extracts from an earlier Ulysses edition, 
but when the estate insisted on a fee of £7000–7500 for extracts from 
the 1922 Paris edition, the Press decided to go with the Rose edition 
instead, apparently believing that it could do so without the estate’s 
 
for example, states, “[t]he copyright in a literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work, or an original 
database shall expire 70 years after the death of the author, irrespective of the date on which the 
work is first lawfully made available to the public.”  Copyright and Related Rights Act 2000 § 24 
(Act No. 28/2000) (Ir.), available at http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/2000/en/act/pub/0028/
sec0024.html#sec24. 
71 JAMES JOYCE, A PORTRAIT OF THE ARTIST AS A YOUNG MAN 172 (Chester G. Anderson ed., 
Viking 1968) (1916). 
72 James Joyce and the First Synthetic Life Form, JAMES JOYCE Q. (Mar. 21, 2011, 12:27 PM), 
http://jjqblog.wordpress.com/2011/03/21/james-joyce-and-the-first-synthetic-life-form. 
73 Cory Doctorow, Man Who Wants to Patent Genome Gets Legal Threat for Embedding James 
Joyce Quote in Artificial Lifeform, BOINGBOING (Mar. 24, 2011), http://boingboing.net/2011/03/
24/man-who-wants-to-pat.html. 
74 See, e.g., JAMES JOYCE, A PORTRAIT OF THE ARTIST AS A YOUNG MAN 200 (B. W. Huebsch 
1916). 
75 Prior to the enactment of the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act in 1998, U.S. 
copyrights in works published before 1978 endured for seventy-five years from the year of first 
publication.  17 U.S.C. § 304(b) (1994) (amended 1998).  A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man 
was first published in New York in 1916.  JOHN J. SLOCUM & HERBERT CAHOON, A 
BIBLIOGRAPHY OF JAMES JOYCE 18–19 (Greenwood Press 1971) (1953). 
76 JAMES JOYCE, ULYSSES: A READER’S EDITION (Danis Rose ed., Macmillan/Picador 1997) 
(1922). 
77 IRISH WRITING IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY: A READER (David Pierce ed., 2000). 
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permission under Irish regulations protecting “third parties” who were 
affected by the revival of copyrights pursuant to the European Council 
Directive.78  The Irish High Court agreed with the Estate’s contentions, 
however, and granted an injunction, whereupon Cork University Press 
decided to forgo further litigation and instead printed the anthology with 
the Joyce extracts carefully excised and a cardboard blank inserted 
bearing the notice, “Pages 323–346 have been removed due to a dispute 
in relation to copyright.”79 
A similar mutilation mars the pages of Fredson Bowers and the 
Irish Wolfhound, a learned bibliographic study published in 2002 by the 
Irish scholar J.C.C. Mays.  On page seventy-one of this monograph, 
Mays had planned to reproduce an elaborate diagram, hand-drawn by 
Joyce himself rather in the style of the Book of Kells crossed with 
Gray’s Anatomy, and intended by Joyce to elucidate the biological and 
evolutionary themes underlying the “Oxen of the Sun” episode of 
Ulysses.80  But this was not to be.  In place of Joyce’s drawing, page 
seventy-one carries the following black-bordered notice: 
The copyright-holder has refused permission to reproduce the chosen 
illustration and the reader must therefore consult either the original 
in London or a facsimile-transcription . . . . Meanwhile, visualize a 
sheet of paper containing nine enlarging ovals rising from the same 
 
78 Specifically, Cork University Press argued that it could lawfully receive a sublicense to print 
extracts of the Danis Rose edition from Rose’s existing licensee, Macmillan Publishers Ltd., 
under § 14(2) of the European Communities (Term of Protection of Copyright) Regulations, 
1995, S.I. 158 (Ir.), as adopted in the Irish Republic.  This regulation insulated from liability any 
“person” that “has acquired (whether before or after the commencement of these Regulations) 
rights” in a work . . . “from a person exploiting that work or other matter [if] copyright in that 
work or other matter has been revived by virtue of these Regulations.”  Id.  This broadly drafted 
provision raised a number of knotty questions that the Irish High Court was unwilling to resolve 
on a motion for a preliminary injunction.  Sweeney v. Nat’l Univ. of Ir. Cork, [2001] 2 I.R. 6, 
[2001] 1 I.L.R.M. 310 (H. Ct., 2000) (Ir.), available at http://www.bailii.org/ie/cases/IEHC/2000/
70.html.  Because Cork University Press did not pursue the matter at a trial for a permanent 
injunction, these questions were not addressed definitively in the context of the Rose edition in 
Ireland. 
  There is no doubt that under Britain’s counterpart to the Irish regulations, an anthology 
issued in Northern Ireland or Britain could lawfully have printed extracts of the 1922 Ulysses 
under the compulsory license provision discussed earlier in this Article.  See supra note 61 and 
accompanying text.  The Irish regulations lacked such a compulsory license, however.  This 
divergence between Ireland’s and Britain’s rules demonstrates some of the obstacles that faced 
“third parties” who hoped for wide dissemination in Europe of works they had created on the 
basis of works whose copyrights had been revived by the copyright-term harmonization 
Directive.  “Differences in the nature of the transitional provisions adopted by each country are 
regrettable [and] produce further possible trade barriers within the European Economic Area.”  
Brad Sherman & Lionel Bently, Balance and Harmony in the Duration of Copyright: The 
European Directive and Its Consequences, in TEXTUAL MONOPOLIES: LITERARY COPYRIGHT 
AND THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 15, 23 (Patrick Parrinder & Warren Chernaik eds., 1997); see also 
Robert Spoo, A Rose Is a Rose Is a Roth, 16 JAMES JOYCE LIT. SUPP. 3–4 (Spring 2002) 
(discussing the Joyce estate’s lawsuits over Rose’s Ulysses edition). 
79 IRISH WRITING IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY, supra note 77, at 323–46. 
80 JOYCE, supra note 52, at 314–49.  Joyce’s diagram was reproduced in color as a foldout 
between pages 162 and 163 of JAMES JOYCE, Oxen of the Sun, JOYCE’S ULYSSES NOTESHEETS IN 
THE BRITISH MUSEUM (Phillip F. Herring ed., 1972). 
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base-point, drawn to represent the stages of foetal growth.  Minutely-
written gynaecological details are inserted at the apex of eight of the 
nine ovals.  Surrounding the design, crowding in from each corner of 
the page, are words and phrases chosen to illustrate successive stages 
in the evolution of English prose.81 
The fact that copyright law does not prevent copyrighted works 
from being described offers little consolation to a reader deprived of 
Joyce’s fascinating visual commentary on one of the most difficult 
episodes of Ulysses. 
One reason why the Irish High Court was unwilling to let Cork 
University Press go forward with the extracts from Danis Rose’s edition 
of Ulysses was that separate litigation over the Rose edition had not yet 
concluded in Britain.  In an independent lawsuit commenced in the 
English High Court in 1997, the Joyce estate had sought an 
interlocutory injunction to prevent publication of the Rose edition by 
British Macmillan/Picador, in part because of the estate’s well-
publicized opposition to Rose’s editorial methods and results.82  The 
estate’s allegations included copyright infringement, the unfair-
competition tort of “passing off,” and violation of James Joyce’s moral 
rights,83 although the moral rights theory evidently dropped out at some 
point in the litigation. 
After opening skirmishes in 1997, the Joyce estate decided to 
pursue the matter directly at trial, whereupon publication of the Rose 
edition went ahead as scheduled.  In November 2001, after a full trial, 
Justice Lloyd of the English High Court, Chancery Division, ruled that 
the edition had infringed the copyrights in certain manuscript materials 
published after Joyce’s death—notably, what has become known as the 
Rosenbach manuscript.84 
Justice Lloyd’s lengthy opinion addressed three principal issues: 
(1) Did Rose’s edition infringe the copyright in any text of Ulysses 
published during Joyce’s lifetime?  (2) Did the edition infringe the 
copyright in any work by Joyce published after his death?  (3) Did the 
edition constitute “passing off”—that is, was the edition so different 
from the “class of goods” that is known to the reading and purchasing 
public as “Ulysses by James Joyce” that the edition, as an instance of 
false labeling, substantially harmed the “goodwill” that the Joyce estate 
had acquired in the “trade name” of “Ulysses by James Joyce”?85 
 
81 J.C.C. MAYS, FREDSON BOWERS AND THE IRISH WOLFHOUND 71 (2002). 
82 See Stephen James Joyce, The “Reader’s edition” of “Ulysses” (letter to the editor), TIMES 
LIT. SUPP., June 27, 1997, at 17 (denouncing the Rose edition as an “outrageous 
misrepresentation of Ulysses,” marred by many editorial “distortions”). 
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The court answered the first of these questions in the negative.  At 
the time the case was decided, pursuant to the European Council’s 
copyright-term harmonization Directive, lifetime editions of Joyce’s 
works enjoyed “revived” copyright in the United Kingdom and the 
Republic of Ireland, and these resurrected rights were subject to 
statutory limitations that permitted third parties to use or reproduce the 
works without permission in specified circumstances, as noted above.86  
Having begun the project of re-editing Ulysses prior to Britain’s target 
implementation date for revived copyrights (July 1, 1995), Rose and his 
publisher raised as a defense their position as “reliance parties,” that is, 
parties who had relied upon the then public-domain status of Ulysses, 
and who, therefore, under British law, could not be held to have 
infringed.87 
But in a strict interpretation of the U.K. reliance-party exemptions, 
the High Court ruled that, because Rose had not actually completed 
work on his edition prior to certain cutoff dates set by the British 
regulations, and because he and Macmillan had not yet concluded a 
publishing contract by either of those dates, the reliance-party 
exemptions did not apply to the edition.88  The court did rule, however, 
that a different third-party exception—one that provided for a 
compulsory license for any use of a revived copyright in Britain89—
rescued Rose and Macmillan from being infringers of any lifetime 
edition of Ulysses (in particular, the 1922 text, which the court 
determined had been the primary source for Rose’s edition) and 
required only that Macmillan arrange for retroactive payment of a 
reasonable royalty to the Estate.90 
Justice Lloyd did find infringement, however.  The third-party 
exceptions for use of revived copyrights did not apply to copyrights that 
had never been revived because they had never lapsed, such as those in 
Joyce’s manuscript materials, which were published in the 1970s.  In an 
interpretive move that resembles the text-editing theory known as 
“versioning,”91 the court held that pre-publication versions of Ulysses, 
to the extent that they differed in some significant way from the 
published text, constituted independent authorial “works” for purposes 
 
86 Supra notes 61, 78, and accompanying text. 
87 Duration of Copyright and Rights in Performances Regulations, 1995, S.I. 1995/3297, art. 23 
(U.K.). 
88 Sweeney, [2001] EWHC (Ch.) 460.  To put this another way, it was no defense that Rose 
finished most of the work on his edition while the 1922 Ulysses was out of copyright in Britain, 
or that he and Macmillan had engaged in preliminary contract discussions.  The defense would 
have been good only if Rose either had begun and finished the edition within the public-domain 
window or had executed a contract with Macmillan during that interval. 
89 See supra note 61. 
90 Sweeney, [2001] EWHC (Ch.) 460. 
91 See JEROME J. MCGANN, A CRITIQUE OF MODERN TEXTUAL CRITICISM 55–63 (1983) 
(discussing editorial reliance on particular historical versions of texts as an alternative to earlier 
approaches that sought to establish an ideal text embodying the author’s intentions). 
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of copyright.  The Court reasoned: 
[I]f I am right in concluding that each successive stage of Joyce’s 
work on Ulysses, from the proto-drafts of particular sections, via the 
Rosenbach manuscript and the typescripts, to the various proofs, 
constituted a new copyright work, at any rate in all cases where there 
was any change beyond the purely minimal and insignificant, it 
follows that the only work that was published was the last-pre-
publication version, namely the final approved page proofs including 
any amendments made by Joyce on them.92 
What Judge John M. Woolsey’s famous 1933 Ulysses decision had 
been to the problem of obscenity law and avant-garde literary values,93 
Justice Lloyd’s opinion was to the interplay of copyright and textual 
theory.  Both jurists, with the assistance of counsel and expert 
testimony, sought to understand the bearing of complex nonlegal 
theories on the law and the literary phenomenon of Ulysses.94 
According to Justice Lloyd, then, the Rosenbach manuscript, 
which he used to test for infringement, enjoyed its own U.K. copyright 
as a separate work of authorship.  Concluding that Rose’s use of words 
and phrases drawn from the Rosenbach manuscript had been 
“substantial,” the court held that his edition infringed the copyright in 
the manuscript.95  Moreover, in a ruling that highlighted some of the 
differences between British “fair dealing” and the generally more robust 
American doctrine of fair use,96 Justice Lloyd held that Rose’s 
emendations did not qualify as fair dealing, categorically, because they 
had not been made for “the purposes of research, private study, criticism 
and review.”97  In short, Rose and Macmillan were infringers of the 
copyright in that authorial “work” known as the Rosenbach 
manuscript—a heterogeneous assemblage of autograph pages which 
Joyce cobbled together over several years for sale to a collector,98 and 
which few scholars today would consider a unitary “work” in any 
creative, organic sense.99  But copyright law has its own pragmatic 
 
92 Sweeney, [2001] EWHC (Ch.) 460. 
93 United States v. One Book Called ‘Ulysses,’ 5 F. Supp. 182, 185 (S.D.N.Y. 1933) (holding that 
Ulysses was not obscene under the federal Tariff Act of 1930 and could be admitted into the 
United States), aff’d sub nom. United States v. One Book Entitled Ulysses by James Joyce, 72 
F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1934). 
94 See PAUL VANDERHAM, JAMES JOYCE AND CENSORSHIP: THE TRIALS OF ULYSSES 115–31 
(1998) (discussing Judge Woolsey’s Ulysses decision and his solicitation of advice from “literary 
assessors”). 
95 Sweeney, [2001] EWHC (Ch.) 460. 
96 See Michael J. Madison, Madisonian Fair Use, 30 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 39, 48 (2012) 
(noting that fair dealing in countries such as England and Canada is “clearly more narrow than 
fair use”). 
97 Sweeney, [2001] EWHC (Ch.) 460. 
98 ELLMANN, supra note 66, at 481, 489, 558–59. 
99 See, e.g., GEORGE BORNSTEIN, MATERIAL MODERNISM: THE POLITICS OF THE PAGE 125 
(2001) (describing the Rosenbach manuscript as a “combination of fair copies for most chapters 
and working drafts for three others, consisting mostly of a holograph manuscript on separate 
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needs and theoretical imperatives; and for Justice Lloyd’s purposes, the 
Rosenbach manuscript was a “work.” 
Finally, Justice Lloyd held that sales of the Rose edition did not 
constitute “passing off” of an inferior product under the trade name of 
“Ulysses by James Joyce.”100  To be subject to passing off, the court 
noted, Ulysses would have to constitute a “class of goods” sufficient to 
be identified in the public mind with certain characteristics conferring 
“goodwill,” or economic reputational value, on its present source, the 
estate.101  When challenged to describe the characteristics defining this 
class of goods, counsel for the estate pointed to Joyce’s use of 
unconventional verbal forms, interior monologue, and other distinctive 
literary techniques.  But how, persisted the court, can we know when a 
product such as Rose’s edition is or is not within the alleged class of 
goods?  Counsel replied that any edition approved by James Joyce 
himself or subsequently by his estate is within the class.  The court 
dismissed out of hand this circular and self-serving definition, and 
rejected as well, for its “inherent uncertainty,” the suggestion that “the 
general body of academic opinion at any given time” could serve to 
define what is and what is not within the class of goods known as 
Ulysses.102 
Justice Lloyd noted that a conventional instance of passing off 
would be “selling lemon juice in a plastic lemon-shaped container 
which customers associate with a different manufacturer.”103  One court 
observer quipped, 
If someone went around selling copies of Ulysses that turned out to 
be John Grisham novels wrapped in the wrong dust-jacket, they 
might be liable.  But while it could be argued (as many do) that 
Rose’s isn’t a good edition of Ulysses, you couldn’t really say it 
wasn’t Ulysses at all.  And it is something, I suppose, to know that 
Ulysses doesn’t fall into quite the same category as plastic lemons.104 
It is fortunate, in my view, that the court denied this “passing off” 
claim.  Such an elastic concept, if dignified by legal precedent, might 
have strengthened the Joyce estate’s hand against any Ulysses-based 
project that it had not pre-approved, and, further, might have been used 
by owners of revived copyrights to circumvent the various exemptions 
in favor of third-party users under British and Irish law.  Indeed, 
because a theory of passing off operates independently of copyright law 
 
leaves but including two notebooks for the last two chapters”). 




104 Thomas Jones, Short Cuts, LONDON REV. BOOKS, Dec. 13, 2001, at 20, available at http:// 
www.lrb.co.uk/v23/n24/thomas-jones/short-cuts. 
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and logic, such a theory might have been employed to resurrect 
protection for works whose copyrights had expired.  Courts are properly 
wary of attempts to stack protections atop the already formidable 
copyright monopoly. 
In 2003, the U.S. Supreme Court registered a similar discomfort 
with attempts to stretch what are essentially trademark concepts to fit 
the traditional subject matter of copyright law.  In Dastar v. Twentieth 
Century Fox Film Corp.,105 a videotape producer, Dastar, released its 
own adapted version of an earlier television series about the Second 
World War which had fallen into the public domain when Fox, the 
owner of the copyright in the earlier series, failed to renew the 
copyright.  Despite the public-domain status of the series, Fox sued 
Dastar for adapting and selling the series without crediting Fox as the 
creator of the copied footage, alleging that in doing so, Dastar had 
passed the footage off as its own, in violation of federal trademark law.  
The Supreme Court squarely held that federal trademark law’s 
prohibition of passing off refers to unlawful uses of physical goods in 
commerce, but not to expressive or communicative content, which is the 
province of copyright law.106  The opinion of the Court, authored by 
Justice Scalia, reflected a healthy skepticism of efforts to use trademark 
as what he called “a species of mutant copyright law that limits the 
public’s federal right to copy and to use.”107  Justice Scalia went on to 
envision an infinite regression of origins that such efforts would make 
possible: 
A video of the MGM film Carmen Jones, after its copyright has 
expired, would presumably require attribution not just to MGM, but 
to Oscar Hammerstein II (who wrote the musical on which the film 
was based), to Georges Bizet (who wrote the opera on which the 
musical was based), and to Prosper Mérimée (who wrote the novel 
on which the opera was based).  In many cases, figuring out who is 
in the line of “origin” would be no simple task.108 
The law, observed Justice Scalia, does not require a “search for the 
source of the Nile and all its tributaries.”109  Imagine a requirement of 
that sort being applied to Joyce’s use of public-domain materials in 
Ulysses.  Since nearly every page of the book contains quotations from 
or allusions to earlier works,110 Joyce’s acknowledgments section would 
 
105 539 U.S. 23 (2003). 
106 Id. at 31–33. 
107 Id. at 34 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
108 Id. at 35. 
109 Id. at 36. 
110 See generally DON GIFFORD & ROBERT J. SEIDMAN, ULYSSES ANNOTATED (2d ed. 1988) 
(offering a page-by-page elucidation of Joyce’s borrowing from other works); WELDON 
THORNTON, ALLUSIONS IN ULYSSES: AN ANNOTATED LIST (1968) (same). 
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have been practically as long as the text,111 and the Joyce estate might 
years ago have been locked in trademark litigation with the Homer 
estate (or estates). 
In 2006, the Joyce estate found itself in the novel position of being 
served as a defendant in a lawsuit.  Professor Carol Loeb Shloss of 
Stanford University’s English Department, after spending years 
researching the sparsely documented life of James Joyce’s talented and 
troubled daughter, Lucia, had published a 576-page biography, Lucia 
Joyce: To Dance in the Wake, with Farrar, Straus and Giroux in 2003,112 
but not before she and her publisher deleted many quotations after 
receiving multiple threats from the Joyce estate.  The estate had sent 
aggressive letters to Shloss, her publisher, her publisher’s president, her 
publisher’s lawyer, and her university’s provost;113 and Shloss had felt 
that she had no choice but to make substantial cuts to the quotations that 
formed the evidentiary basis for many of her claims.114 
Frustrated by the mutilation she was forced to inflict on her work, 
Shloss informed the Joyce estate in 2005 that she planned to launch a 
website containing the quoted material that she had stripped from the 
book.  The website would, in effect, contain the author’s cut, the version 
that she had originally hoped would reach the public.  The estate 
promptly replied that any such website would constitute “an 
unwarranted infringement of the Estate’s copyright,” and rejected “the 
notion that the proposed use could be made in the absence of consent 
under the fair use doctrine.”115  By the time she received the estate’s 
warning, Shloss had assembled a legal team that included Lawrence 
Lessig, Mark Lemley, attorneys at the Stanford Center for Internet and 
Society, and myself.116 
A few days before Bloomsday 2006, we filed Shloss’s complaint 
in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, naming 
the Joyce estate and its trustee, Seán Sweeney as defendants.117  The 
 
111 See PAUL K. SAINT-AMOUR, THE COPYWRIGHTS: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE 
LITERARY IMAGINATION 193–98 (2003) (conducting a “thought experiment” in which Joyce, 
writing Ulysses under the present copyright regime, is required to clear rights for many works that 
his novel quotes or adapts). 
112 CAROL LOEB SHLOSS, LUCIA JOYCE: TO DANCE IN THE WAKE (2003).  The following 
account of Shloss’s lawsuit is a revised and updated version of the account given in Robert E. 
Spoo, Archival Foreclosure: A Scholar’s Lawsuit Against the Estate of James Joyce, 71 AM. 
ARCHIVIST 544 (2008). 
113 Amended Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief at 4, 8–11, Shloss v. 
Sweeney, No. CV 06-3718 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 25, 2006), available at http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/
publications/shloss-v-estate-joyce-amended-complaint. 
114 Id. at 11–12. 
115 Id. at 12–14. 
116 My involvement in the lawsuit spanned my employment at two law firms—Doerner, 
Saunders, Daniel & Anderson, LLP, in Tulsa, Oklahoma, and Howard Rice Nemerovsky Canady 
Falk and Rabkin, PC, in San Francisco, both of which provided substantial pro bono support in 
the lawsuit. 
117 Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief; Demand for Jury Trial, Shloss v. 
Sweeney, No. CV 06-3718 (N.D. Cal. June 12, 2006), available at http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/
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complaint sought, among other things, a judicial declaration that 
Shloss’s proposed website (which was to be confined to IP addresses in 
the United States) made fair use of copyrighted Joyce materials under 
U.S. law and that the estate had unclean hands as a result of engaging in 
a pattern of inequitable conduct for years.118  An innovative contention 
of Shloss’s lawsuit was that the Joyce estate was guilty of having 
committed copyright misuse—an attempt to extend its monopoly power 
beyond its proper economic sphere by leveraging copyrights to shut 
down scholarly discussion, to attack scholars, to prevent use of 
materials that had passed out of copyright or had never been protected 
by copyright, and to interfere with Shloss’s access to physical 
documents in libraries and archives.119  If Shloss could prove copyright 
misuse, we felt, the estate might be prevented from enforcing its 
copyrights against her, at least until the estate had purged the 
misconduct and its effects.120  Although copyright misuse is often 
asserted against monopolistic conduct violative of antitrust laws, we 
hoped to take advantage of a growing willingness on the part of courts 
to extend the doctrine to new fact patterns on public policy grounds.121 
An unusual aspect of the copyright misuse doctrine is that it 
permits a defendant or a declaratory-judgment plaintiff to offer evidence 
not only of acts of misuse that have been directed at her, but also 
evidence of misuse visited upon nonparty individuals.122  This provides 
the defendant with evidentiary standing to blow the whistle on bad 
behavior that has not caused her any direct harm.  As a result, Shloss’s 
complaint alleged, with particularity, that the Joyce estate had misused 
its copyrights by consistently attempting to interfere with lawful uses by 
students, authors, and academics whose scholarly projects had been 
impaired or foreclosed by the estate’s unjustified aggressions.123 
Once the estate had secured representation by the Los Angeles 
 
attachments/Complaint%20Endorsed%20Filed%206-12-06.pdf. 
118 Id. at 19–23. 
119 Amended Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief, supra note 113, at 8, 
15–19. 
120 See Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 979 n.22 (4th Cir. 1990). 
121 See, e.g., Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Home Entm’t, Inc., 342 F.3d 191, 203 (3d Cir. 
2003) (noting that the misuse doctrine might apply where a copyright owner tried to restrain 
another’s creative expression, even though the owner had not engaged in anticompetitive 
behavior); Assessment Techs. of Wis., LLC v. WIREdata, Inc., 350 F.3d 640, 647 (7th Cir. 2003) 
(suggesting that the misuse doctrine need not be confined to anticompetitive conduct); Alcatel 
USA, Inc. v. DGI Techs., Inc., 166 F.3d 772, 792 (5th Cir. 1999) (explaining that copyright 
misuse is an “unclean hands defense” that forbids the use of a copyright to secure a right or 
monopoly not granted by the copyright and “which is contrary to public policy to grant”). 
122 See Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 979 (“[T]he defense of copyright misuse is available even if the 
defendants themselves have not been injured by the misuse.”); Practice Mgmt. Info. Corp. v. Am. 
Med. Ass’n, 121 F.3d 516, 520–21 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that a declaratory-judgment plaintiff 
was permitted to raise a misuse defense by pointing to an anticompetitive copyright license 
granted to a nonparty). 
123 Amended Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief, supra note 113, at 15–
19. 
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office of Jones Day, we engaged with counsel in a lengthy discussion of 
preliminary issues: personal jurisdiction over the estate and its trustee, 
scheduling, and possible settlement.  In November 2006, the estate 
made its first significant move by filing a motion to dismiss Shloss’s 
lawsuit in its entirety or, alternatively, to have certain allegations and 
claims stricken from the complaint.124  The estate was particularly eager 
to strike allegations that it had engaged in copyright misuse.125  The 
motion asserted that Shloss had no real and reasonable fear, at the time 
of the lawsuit, or ever, of being sued by the estate for copyright 
infringement.126  As strange as that sounded to those who knew 
anything about the facts, we had to treat the argument as a serious one 
because federal law does not permit a U.S. court to entertain a lawsuit 
unless a genuine, concrete dispute exists between the parties.127  Had it 
turned out that Shloss lacked a reasonable apprehension of suit, the 
court would not have had the power to go on refereeing a hypothetical 
controversy. 
In its motion to dismiss, the Joyce estate was not content to 
challenge the legal basis for Shloss’s lawsuit; it also launched attacks on 
her qualities as a scholar and her motivations as a plaintiff.128  It 
asserted that her lawyers were only seeking “to air their views and test 
their theories in a public forum.”129  One of the estate’s lawyers even 
spent two days at the Harry Ransom Humanities Research Center in 
Austin, Texas, studying a document by Lucia Joyce for the purpose of 
creating a lengthy motion exhibit analyzing Shloss’s transcriptions of 
the document and pointing to minor copying errors.130 
We responded with opposition papers that placed before the court, 
along with other evidence, numerous letters that Joyce’s grandson had 
written targeting Shloss’s book project, including letters to her publisher 
announcing that the estate was “willing to take any necessary action to 
enforce its copyrights”; that the estate’s “record in legal terms is crystal 
clear and that it [was] prepared to put [its] money where [its] mouth 
[was]”; that Shloss’s book would be published “à vos risques et périls” 
 
124 Notice of Motion and Motion of Defendants Seán Sweeney and the Estate of James Joyce to 
Dismiss, or in the Alternative to Strike, Carol Loeb Shloss’s Amended Complaint; Memorandum 
of Points and Authorities in Support Thereof, Shloss v. Sweeney, No. C06-3718 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 
17, 2006) [hereinafter Notice of Motion and Motion to Dismiss], available at http://cyber
law.stanford.edu/files/blogs/Motion%20to%20Dismiss%20Shloss%20Complaint%5B1%5D.pdf. 
125 Id. at 15–16. 
126 Id. at 10–12. 
127 Denbicare U.S.A. Inc. v. Toys “R” Us, Inc., 84 F.3d 1143, 1146 (9th Cir. 1996); Societe de 
Conditionnement en Aluminium v. Hunter Eng’g Co., 655 F.2d 938, 944 (9th Cir. 1981). 
128 Notice of Motion and Motion to Dismiss, supra note 124, at 3–5. 
129 Id. at 20. 
130 Declaration of Anna E. Raimer in Support of Defendants’ Reply to Plaintiff’s Opposition to 
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative to Strike, Carol Loeb Shloss’s Amended 
Complaint at 1 & Exhibit B, Shloss v. Sweeney, No. C06-3718 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 2007), 
available at http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/california/candce/5:2006cv03718/
180987/44. 
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(“at your risk and peril”); and that “there are more ways than one to skin 
a cat.”131  In a nineteen-page order, Judge James Ware denied the 
estate’s motion to dismiss, holding that these communications from the 
estate, as alleged, “occurred regularly over a period of nine years, from 
1996 to 2005, and easily left [Shloss] with a reasonable apprehension of 
copyright liability when she filed this suit in 2006.”132  The court added 
that, contrary to the estate’s assertion, the case was not a mere 
“academic war” or “hypothetical case.”133 
The court also refused to dismiss or strike Shloss’s copyright 
misuse claim, holding that 
[the estate’s] alleged actions significantly undermined the copyright 
policy of “promoting invention and creative expression,” as [Shloss] 
was allegedly intimidated from using (1) non-copyrightable fact 
works such as medical records and (2) works to which [the estate] 
did not own or control copyrights, such as letters written by third 
parties.134 
Judge Ware concluded that Shloss had also properly alleged 
copyright misuse “based on [the estate’s] actions vis-a-vis [sic] third 
parties”—a ruling that permitted Shloss’s allegations about the estate’s 
treatment of other scholars to remain in the case.135  Having denied the 
estate’s motion to dismiss, the court rejected all of the estate’s motion to 
strike, except as to one paragraph of Shloss’s complaint containing 
certain background allegations.136  Shloss had defeated almost the 
entirety of the estate’s combined motions.  This set the stage for 
settlement. 
It was not Professor Shloss’s wish to settle her lawsuit; the estate 
forced her hand.  At the hearing on the motion to dismiss, the estate’s 
lawyers stated in open court that the estate was considering filing a 
covenant not to sue Shloss for any of the material contained in her 
website.137  Later, the estate made this intention even clearer.  Had the 
 
131 These statements by Stephen James Joyce appeared in his letter to Shloss, dated August 8, 
2003, and his letter to Leon Friedman, an attorney for Farrar Straus and Giroux, dated November 
21, 2002.  Letter from Stephen James Joyce to Carol Loeb Shloss (Aug. 8, 2003) (on file with 
author); Letter from Stephen James Joyce to Leon Friedman, Farrar Straus & Giroux (Nov. 21, 
2002) (on file with author).  These letters and others by Mr. Joyce were quoted in the context of 
factual and legal argument in Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for Lack of 
Subject Matter Jurisdiction and Motion to Strike at 1, 5–8, No. CV 06-3718 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 
2006) (internal quotations omitted), available at http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/files/blogs/Shloss%
20Brief%20FINAL.pdf. 
132 Shloss v. Sweeney, 515 F. Supp. 2d 1068, 1077 (N.D. Cal. 2007). 
133 Id. at 1079 (citing the estate’s Motion to Dismiss at 14) (internal quotations omitted). 
134 Id. at 1080. 
135 Id. at 1081. 
136 Id. at 1082. 
137 At the hearing, the estate’s attorney remarked, “Your Honor, certainly negotiating a covenant 
is something that the Estate has considered. . . . [I]t doesn’t seem that the Estate should have to 
give that covenant.  That doesn’t mean it won’t.”  Transcript of Oral Argument at 18, Shloss v. 
Sweeney, No. CV 06-3718 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 2007) (on file with the author). 
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estate filed such a covenant with the court, Judge Ware would have had 
little choice but to dismiss the case upon the estate’s motion, because a 
federal court, once again, is constitutionally forbidden to entertain a 
lawsuit where a genuine dispute no longer exists between the parties.138  
A covenant would have rendered the case moot because it would have 
given Shloss all the practical relief for which she had sued. 
For us, the question became, what more could our client obtain if 
she accepted dismissal after settlement than if she waited for dismissal 
after a covenant?  The answer can be found in the settlement that the 
parties entered into. Not only did the settlement permit Professor Shloss 
to publish her website exactly as she had originally intended, but she 
could also reproduce it in print form within the United States—
something she had not prayed for in her complaint.139 
The nature of the settlement—a court-approved and court-
enforceable settlement giving her all the practical relief she had sought, 
and more—permitted her, we thought, to ask the court to order the 
Joyce estate to pay her legal fees.  Pro bono assistance may be entitled 
to compensation if the governing statute—here, the Copyright Act—
permits fees to be awarded to the prevailing party.140  So we moved for 
fees, and on May 30, 2007, Judge Ware granted our motion in a five-
page opinion, holding that Professor Shloss was the prevailing party 
because “by the Settlement Agreement, [she] achieved a material, 
judicially sanctioned alteration in the parties’ legal relationship.”141  The 
court explained, 
[Shloss] secured via Settlement Agreement the essence of the relief 
she had sought: the ability to publish the Electronic Supplement 
online for access within the United States, without threat of suit from 
[the estate].  Moreover, [Shloss] secured further relief not even 
requested in her First Amended Complaint: that is, the ability to 
publish her Electronic Supplement in print format, without fear of 
suit from [the estate].  In return, [Shloss] agreed only to dismiss her 
claims with prejudice; she did not agree to pay [the estate] money or 
to limit her conduct.  [The estate’s] contention that they are the 
“prevailing party” because [Shloss] agreed to dismiss her claims with 
prejudice is untenable.142 
What did this order do?  It stated in no uncertain terms that 
Professor Shloss “prevailed” on the basis of the results she obtained.  
Though Shloss did not establish, as she had hoped, a new legal 
 
138 Paramount Pictures Corp. v. RePlayTV, 298 F.Supp.2d 921, 926–27 (C.D. Cal. 2004). 
139 Settlement Agreement at 2, Shloss v. Sweeney, No. CV 06-3718 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 16 & 19, 
2007), available at http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/system/files/Shloss+Settlement+Agreement.pdf.  
This agreement was non-confidential. 
140 17 U.S.C. § 505 (2006). 
141 Shloss v. Sweeney, 515 F.Supp.2d 1083, 1086 (N.D. Cal. 2007). 
142 Id. at 1085–86. 
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precedent for scholars on questions of fair use and copyright misuse, 
she did secure redress for her own project and put the Joyce estate on 
notice that scholars will not always passively endure abuse at the hands 
of a powerful copyright holder, particularly when there are attorneys 
ready to take up the challenge.  Pursuant to a further agreement, the 
parties settled the question of the proper amount of attorney’s fees and 
costs; and the estate paid a total of $240,000, $10,000 of which could be 
deposited in an account for Professor Shloss’s scholarly research.143 
IV. LONG COPYRIGHTS AND QUIXOTIC LITERARY ESTATES 
During an Irish radio interview in 2000, an intriguing justification 
was advanced for reprinting Joyce’s words without leave of the Joyce 
estate: “James Joyce used the city of Dublin and Dublin people in his 
books, so the argument goes that the people should have a moral and 
cultural right to use James Joyce’s material in different ways.”144  This 
is not the sort of argument that would carry much weight with a court, 
but it does point to some of the contradictions inherent in the private 
ownership of a public good like literature.  Ulysses is a modern epic 
assembled from facts, personalities, and events in the Irish public 
domain;145 in that respect, it is not unreasonable for the Irish to view the 
book as more immediately and intimately the property of the people 
than other works of the imagination, and to believe that they are entitled 
to continue the dialogue with Joyce that Joyce initiated with them.  
Joyce himself conceded that he was a “scissors and paste man,”146 an 
adapter and arranger of what came freely to hand. 
In January 2012, editions of Joyce’s works published during his 
lifetime, including Ulysses, entered the public domain throughout the 
European Union.147  Those editions had previously entered the public 
domains of Canada and Australia;148 and in the United States, early 
editions of Joyce’s Dubliners, A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man, 
and Ulysses had shed copyright protection at varying intervals.149  But 
many of Joyce’s writings remain protected by copyright in different 
 
143 Settlement Agreement and Mutual Release, at 6-7, No. CV 06-3718 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 25 and 
26, 2009), http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/files/blogs/Shloss%20Fee%20Settlement%20Agreement
%20and%20Mutual%20Release.pdf.  This agreement was also non-confidential. 
144 Interim Injunction Granted to Joyce Estate in Copyright Case, RTÉ NEWS (Sept. 12, 2000) 
(see sixth audio link) (Interview with Medb Ruane, Morning Ireland), http://www.rte.ie/news/
2000/0912/morningireland.html. 
145 ELLMANN, supra note 66, at 363–67. 
146 Id. at 626 (quoting Joyce). 
147 Most countries within the European Union provide copyright protection for the author’s life 
plus seventy years.  See supra note 70 and accompanying text. 
148 Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-42 § 6 (Can.); Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 33(2) (Austl.). 
149 Prior to 1998, U.S. copyrights in works published before 1978 endured for seventy-five years 
from the year of first publication.  See supra note 75.  According to this calculus, Dubliners (first 
published in 1914), A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man (in 1916), and Ulysses (in 1922) 
entered the American public domain at the end of 1989, 1991, and 1997, respectively.  See 
SLOCUM & CAHOON, supra note 75, at 12–16, 18–19, 24–26. 
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parts of the world.  His last great work, Finnegans Wake, will remain in 
copyright in the United States until the end of 2034,150 though it has 
entered the public domain in other countries.151  Most of Joyce’s 
posthumously published works, including several collections of letters, 
manuscripts, notes, and revised editions of Ulysses and other works, 
will enjoy copyright protection in the United States for some years to 
come.152  Joyce’s unpublished writings—a vast array of letters, notes, 
and manuscripts—are now out of copyright in the United States153 and 
in many European countries,154 but they will not enter the public domain 
in the United Kingdom until 2039;155 and in Australia they may be 
protected in perpetuity.156  Added to all this is the fact that many 
European countries grant a special twenty-five-year economic right to 
the first person who makes available to the public a work that has 
entered the public domain without previously having been made 
available.157  Claims to such post-copyright copyrights have already led 
to disputes over priority in Joyce’s works.158  An irregular patchwork of 
divergent national laws has given rise to an uncoordinated commons 
that threatens to function as an anticommons on a global scale, 
 
150 Finnegans Wake, first published in 1939, was still in copyright when the Sonny Bono 
Copyright Term Extension Act added twenty years to existing copyrights.  See SLOCUM & 
CAHOON, supra note 75, at 59–61; Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-
298, § 102(d)(1)(B), 112 Stat. 2827, 2828 (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 302, 304 (2006)) (enacted in 
1998); supra note 75 (explaining that before the act, copyrights lasted seventy-five years from 
publication).  Therefore, its U.S. copyright runs for ninety-five years from 1939. 
151 Throughout much of Europe, editions of Finnegans Wake that were published during Joyce’s 
lifetime passed out of copyright at the end of 2011, seventy years after his death.  Council 
Directive 93/98/EEC, art. 1, 1993 O.J. (L 290) 9 (EC) (requiring member countries to implement 
a copyright term of the author’s life plus seventy years). 
152 For example, the three major volumes of Joyce’s letters (Letters of James Joyce (Stuart 
Gilbert & Richard Ellmann eds., 1957, 1966)) enjoy copyright protection for ninety-five years 
from the year of first publication.  17 U.S.C. §§ 302, 304 (2006).  A revised edition of Ulysses, 
edited by Hans Walter Gabler and published in 1986, enjoys protection as a work made for hire 
for ninety-five years from 1986.  JAMES JOYCE, supra note 52. See 17 U.S.C. § 302(c). 
153 See 17 U.S.C. § 303(a) (providing for a copyright term of the author’s life plus seventy years 
for unpublished works). 
154 Council Directive 93/98/EEC, art. 1, 1993 O.J. (L 290) 9 (EC) (requiring member countries to 
implement a copyright term of the author’s life plus seventy years). 
155 Copyright Designs and Patents Act, 1988, c. 48, sch. 1, para. 12(4) (U.K.). 
156 See Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 33(3) (Austl.) (providing that a work that was not published or 
otherwise made available to the public before the author’s death is protected for seventy years 
from the year in which the work is first published or first made available to the public). 
157 Council Directive 93/98/EEC, art. 4, 1993 O.J. (L 290) 9 (EC).  The Irish law implementing 
the Directive accordingly provides:  
Any person who, after the expiration of the copyright in a work, lawfully makes 
available to the public for the first time a work which was not previously so made 
available, shall benefit from rights equivalent to the rights of an author, other than the 
moral rights, for 25 years from the date on which the work is first lawfully made 
available to the public.   
Copyright and Related Rights Act 2000 § 34 (Act No. 28/2000) (Ir.), available at http:// 
www.irishstatutebook.ie/2000/en/act/pub/0028/sec0034.html. 
158 See Shane Harrison, Battle over Copyright to James Joyce’s Works, BBC NEWS (Apr. 12, 
2012, 8:44 PM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-17686617 (discussing the 
dispute between Joyce scholar Danis Rose and the National Library of Ireland over who owns 
new European copyrights in Joyce’s previously unpublished works). 
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condemning Joyce’s writings to tragic underuse and selective 
availability.159  Joyce-related copyrights and copyright holders will 
remain a challenge for the foreseeable future. 
In the ecology of copyright, a work like Joyce’s Finnegans Wake 
has its creative origins in the raw materials of the public domain.  With 
the sanction of law, the work comes under private control for a certain 
term, and, when the term has expired, the work returns to the public 
domain to enrich those raw materials and to spur the creation of new 
works.  But excessively long copyright terms upset this ecological 
cycle.  Today, more than seventy years after Joyce’s death, Finnegans 
Wake has become part of the furniture of our cultural life; it has 
outgrown the state-supplied monopoly that technically allows private 
parties to restrict its dissemination and adaptation—just as James Joyce 
has outgrown the efforts of his estate to shape his historical legacy 
according to criteria of family privacy.160 
In its attempts to control Joyce’s image, the estate has taken arms 
against the ungovernable sea of celebrity at precisely the moment when 
Joyce is truly becoming an icon of popular culture (as demonstrated by 
the explosion of dramatic and cinematic treatments of his life and works 
in recent years).161  Over the years, Stephen James Joyce has 
increasingly appeared in the role of aggrieved plaintiff or outraged 
letter-writer seeking to contain history, to redirect the discourse of the 
public sphere, to re-fence the cultural commons.  Armed with a few 
wasting copyrights and some sparse moral rights, and what personal 
authority he can command, Mr. Joyce has tilted repeatedly at the 
academic and pop-culture windmills which, he feels, are making a 
commodity of a beloved family member. 
Mr. Joyce’s efforts have not been without a certain quixotic 
integrity, but their strangely antic and belated quality serves to remind 
us that, in the normal course of culture, the protests of such an 
individual would not command much attention.  But something has 
happened to the normal course of culture.  Extremely long copyrights 
have given artificial voice and weight to the personal predilections of 
 
159 “In an anticommons . . . multiple owners are each endowed with the right to exclude others 
from a scarce resource, and no one has an effective privilege of use.  When there are too many 
owners holding rights of exclusion, the resource is prone to underuse—a tragedy of the 
anticommons.”  Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition 
from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 624 (1998). 
160 For the Joyce estate’s efforts to protect “‘the much abused privacy of the Joyce family,’” see 
D.T. Max, The Injustice Collector: Is James Joyce’s Grandson Suppressing Scholarship?, NEW 
YORKER, June 19, 2006, at 34, 35–36 (quoting Stephen James Joyce). 
161 Each issue of the James Joyce Quarterly includes a current checklist that records Joyce-
inspired cinematic and theatrical productions, radio, television, and Internet broadcasts, musical 
settings, and recordings.  A recent issue lists a New York theatrical production based on the life 
of Lucia Joyce and three CD recordings based on Joyce’s writings, one of them by the English 
singer-songwriter Kate Bush.  William S. Brockman, Current JJ Checklist (112), 48 JAMES 
JOYCE Q. 129, 146 (2010). 
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individuals who, in the absence of such rights, would be ordinary 
participants in the life of art and letters like most of the rest of us.  
These protracted monopolies create, or permit, peculiar and 
unaccustomed distortions of the public sphere; they encourage attempts 
to re-privatize that space, to reclaim it in the interests of family privacy 
or personal taste.  They allow a mere rights-holder to become a 
privileged and arbitrary custodian of culture.162  And all of this would 
be exactly as it should be were these monopolies confined to one 
generation or two.  But to see this capricious veto power being 
exercised at a period so startlingly remote from the cultural and 
historical origins of the work in question is dispiriting.  The phrase “the 
dead hand” comes irresistibly to mind, except that it is a living hand that 
is allowed to reach out to control the spontaneous choices of the public 
domain. 
Normally, we do not think of a “classic” as something that can be 
owned; most of the masterworks we encounter have long resided in the 
public domain, either because their copyrights have expired or because 
they were produced before the advent of copyright statutes.  But with 
copyrights now capable of enduring for more than a century, we can 
expect to see more works attain canonization in the public sphere while 
remaining subject to private control in the marketplace—unless such 
control handicaps the process of canonization in the first place.  
Therefore, it is a wholly understandable intuition that proclaims a 
“cultural right” to use Joyce’s works at this late date without 
permission, despite the fact that—fair use, fair dealing, and other legal 
exceptions aside—the law recognizes no “cultural” defense as such. 
Because of the increasing length and scope of present-day 
copyrights, our cultural and historical relationship to Joyce’s works is 
arguably quite different from Joyce’s relationship to the works of his 
own literary heritage.163  The push for more expansive proprietary rights 
tends to ignore, at our peril, the reality that all cultural production is to 
some extent derivative, either in the specific copyright sense of 
adaptation or in the larger historical sense articulated by T.S. Eliot in his 
famous essay, Tradition and the Individual Talent, where he described 
the latter as compelling an author “to write not merely with his own 
generation in his bones, but with a feeling that the whole of the 
 
162 Of course, one reply to this is to say that a grandson is no “mere rights-holder.”  I realize that 
there are two sides to the question; in this case, I can occupy only one of them.  I have more 
sympathy for the plight of Mr. Fennessy, the banned composer.  See supra note 57 and 
accompanying text.  However, for an intelligent and compassionate exposition of the other, 
familial perspective, see generally Michael Patrick Gillespie, The Papers of James Joyce: Ethical 
Questions for Textually Ambivalent Critics, 2 NEW HIBERNIA REV. 99 (1998), in which Gillespie 
discusses family privacy and scholarly access in connection with archival materials relating to 
Joyce. 
163 See SAINT-AMOUR, supra note 111, at 193–98 (discussing the less propertized literary climate 
in which Joyce wrote). 
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literature of Europe from Homer and within it the whole of the literature 
of his own country has a simultaneous existence and composes a 
simultaneous order.”164  Nowadays, attempts to engage in either type of 
derivation can raise the specter of lawsuits and court injunctions; 
copyright terms have grown so long that they play an unprecedented 
role in determining the availability of tradition to the individual talent.  
Eliot’s relationship to the usable past of his own day is very different, I 
would contend, from the relationship of the present-day individual 
talent to Eliot; and much of that difference springs from the distortions 
introduced by overlong copyrights.165 
This is why aging copyrights for works like Ulysses or Finnegans 
Wake may be likened to Dorian Gray, a superficial attractiveness hiding 
the disfigurements of creative stagnancy, monopoly pricing, absence of 
competition, and underproduction.166  Copyrights will continue to play a 
large role in our experience of Joyce’s creativity well into the twenty-
first century in many parts of the world.  The global market for Joyce’s 
works, as I suggested above, threatens to be impeded by a congested 
checkerboard of international laws.  Global access to his complete 
writings may not be possible in the near future: a selective Joyce in 
selected countries may be all we can hope for. 
Nevertheless, now that Ulysses and other works by Joyce have 
begun to enter the public domain in various countries, we may witness, 
just as we did some years ago when copyrights in Dubliners and A 
Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man expired in the United States, an 
explosion of cheap reprints and new editions of Joyce’s writings.167  We 
 
164 T.S. ELIOT, Tradition and the Individual Talent, in SELECTED PROSE OF T.S. ELIOT 37, 38 
(Frank Kermode ed., Harcourt Inc. 1975) (1919). 
165 See Robert Spoo, Ezra Pound’s Copyright Statute: Perpetual Rights and the Problem of 
Heirs, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1775, 1816–27 (2009) (discussing the restrictive policies of modernist 
literary estates and the different conditions under which T.S. Eliot and his contemporaries wrote). 
166 “The absence of copyright eliminates monopoly pricing, and marginal cost decreases when a 
royalty no longer has to be paid.  The fundamental premise of copyright as an incentive is that it 
allows the extraction of monopoly profits during its term.”  Dennis S. Karjala, Judicial Review of 
Copyright Term Extension Legislation, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 199, 225–26 (2002). 
167 A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man, first published in the United States in 1916, entered 
the public domain here on January 1, 1992.  See SLOCUM & CAHOON, supra note 75; see also 
supra note 149.  Up to that time, three versions of the novel were in print in the United States: a 
Penguin paperback at $4.95; a Penguin paperback with critical apparatus at $9.95; and a reprint 
edition by Amereon Ltd. at $17.95.  6 BOOKS IN PRINT 1990–91, at 4924 (1990).  In 1997, the 
same three versions were still in print, now retailing at $7.00, $14.95, and $20.95, respectively; 
but the following versions were also available, most of them first published in 1991 or after: a 
Bantam paperback at $3.95; a NAL-Dutton paperback at $4.95; a Dover paperback reprint at 
$2.00; a Holt student edition at $10.00; a Knopf edition at $17.00; a North Books large-type 
edition at $24.00; a Buccaneer Books reprint edition at $26.95; a Viking Penguin paper edition, 
with a new introduction and notes, at $8.95; a St. Martin edition, with a revised text and critical 
essays, at $35.00; a Garland hardcover, with a newly edited text and critical apparatus, at $55.00; 
and a Random House paper edition of the same text at $9.00.  7 BOOKS IN PRINT 1996–97, at 
6542 (1996).  The last four titles give some idea of the scholarly creativity and industry that 
public-domain accessibility can unleash.  See also Warwick Gould, Predators and Editors: Yeats 
in the Pre- and Post-Copyright Era, in TEXTUAL MONOPOLIES, supra note 78, at 74–80 
(documenting the vastly increased sales in the United Kingdom of inexpensive editions of W.B. 
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may also see uninhibited use of the work in streamed Internet 
performances, public readings, dramatic and cinematic adaptations, and 
multimedia digital presentations complete with period photographs, 
Dublin maps, sound clips of Irish songs, and hyperlinks to critical 
interpretations and manuscript sources.168  When that happens, Joyce’s 
oeuvre will finally take its place with The Odyssey and The Aeneid as 
raw myth-making material for some future national epic.  Indeed, it 
could be argued that works do not really become “classics” until they 
are unqualifiedly available for cultural exploitation.  It would follow 
that overlong copyright protection is an inhibition on the full organic 
development of a classic. 
CONCLUSION: ULYSSES AND THE WISDOM OF THE AGING 
A wise copyright law would resemble, not Tithonus or Dorian 
Gray, but Tennyson’s Ulysses, that figure for the dynamic possibilities 
of old age.  In Tennyson’s conception of the man of many devices, 
Ulysses’ return to his island kingdom of Ithaca is only another brief 
stopover in a life of restless wanderings; already, the aging king has 
tired of his landlubberly responsibilities and is disgusted by the 
unadventurous appetites of his subjects, who “hoard, and sleep, and 
feed, and know not me,”169 in contrast to his hardy seagoing 
companions.  Ulysses is the antithesis of stasis and stay-at-home 
comfort; he knows that he cannot know himself fully until he 
encounters his non-self in the transformative strangeness of new 
experiences and foreign customs.  He has been altered by and become a 
part of all that he has met, in a restless exchange of self and other, 
original and adaptation, individual talent and tradition.  In contrast to 
the intrepid, impulsive Ulysses, his son Telemachus has all the qualities 
that make for competent kingship: he is just, capable, and blandly 
statesmanlike, but he is also unremarkable, better suited than his father 
to the tedious administering of “[u]nequal laws unto a savage race.”170  
It galls Ulysses that he himself has “become a name,”171 a famous 
trademark rather than a creative force in action.  “How dull it is to 
pause, to make an end, / To rust unburnish’d, not to shine in use!”172 
 
Yeats’s poems following the temporary expiration of Yeats’s U.K. copyrights in 1990). 
As of this writing, new, unauthorized editions of Joyce’s works are already beginning to appear.  
See, e.g., JAMES JOYCE, ULYSSES: REMASTERED (Robert Gogan ed., Music Ireland Publ’ns 2012) 
(1922).  Gogan’s edition will likely prove controversial, as he has “remastered” Joyce’s text to 
render its difficult style more accessible to the common reader. 
168 Multimedia versions of Ulysses and other works by Joyce have long been in preparation, 
notably a hypertext Ulysses project conceived by Professor Michael Groden of the University of 
Western Ontario.  Robert Spoo, Preparatory to Anything Else, 33 JAMES JOYCE Q. 491, 493–94 
(1996). 
169 TENNYSON, supra note 1, at 88. 
170 Id. 
171 Id. 
172 Id. at 89. 
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At its best, the law can resemble Tennyson’s Ulysses in its 
capacity to resist a comfortable commercialism that permits a handful of 
old copyrights to generate a steady, protected income for an even 
smaller number of copyright holders, while myriads of forgotten works 
rust unburnished in the armory of unnecessary protection.  Copyright 
law reveals its true genius when it challenges society to depart from the 
economically safe and the artistically predictable by using its older 
creations to discover new ones; to test the validity and staying power of 
popular works that have long enjoyed the comforts of monopoly; to 
subject famous sounds and images to the fires of irony, parody, and 
cultural vandalism; and to probe the transformative potential of 
forgotten works that have long lain under the deterrent pall of a useless 
copyright.  Such a law would protect the rights of creators for a just and 
reasonable time, yet not needlessly bar the way to “that untravell’d 
world whose margin fades / For ever and for ever when [we] move.”173  
Such a law would be worthy of a world equipped with more and better 
means of communicating imaginative products than ever before in 
history.  We are entitled to a copyright law equal to our own brave 
possibilities, to our ambition, like that of the embarking Ulysses, “[t]o 





174 Id. at 90. 
